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PREFACE 
A review of studies concerned with the Suez Crisis of 1956 1 reveal-
ed that writers had not considered the problem solely in reference to 
the national interest of the United States. It was believed that by 
using national objectives, goals, and interest as central referents, it 
would be possible to assess the effectiveness of United States' policies. 
The writer wishes to express his gratitude and appreciation to Dr. 
Clifford A. L. Rich, Head of the Political Science Department, for his 
patience and valuable guidance. Sincere appreciation is also expressed 
to Dr. Raymond Habiby and Mr. Harold v. Sare for reading the thesis and 
offering valuable advice. 
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John Foster Dulles was one of the most controversial men tc? hold the 
office of Secretary of State. Much of the controversy in which he was 
involved was caused by the policies he followed during the Suez Crisis of 
19560. Anthony Eden, Prime Minister of Great Britain during the period, 
expressed his opinion of Dulles' actions as betrayal by an ally of some 
BO years standing: "The United States officials refused to cooperate at 
any level •••• ~he attitude was ••• that the President had been slighted be-
cause its allie$ acted without permission. The allies must pay for it, 
and pay they did. 01 Herman Finer,·of the University of Chicago, received 
assistance from the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Endowment for Inte~-
national P~ace and the American Council of Learned Societies2 to investi-
gate the policy of Secretary Dulles during the Oanal Crisis. After 512 
pages of exhaustive study this author concluded that Dulles was a coward: 
"The full price has not yet been paid for Dulles• deficiency of .nerve in 
not standing fast at the Suez Brink created by Nasser •••• faced with real• 
ity in Suez and Sinai, his action was stultified by a want of courage,"3 
It is not the purpose of this study to defend Mr. Dulles, even though 
1Anthony Eden, Full Ci:t'cle, (Boston, 1960), p~ 634. ----· 
2Herman Finer, Dulles Over Suez, (Chicago, 1964), p. XI. -----. 
3tbid_. 9 pQ 512. 
l 
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' he may have been unjustly criticized. Instead, the purpose here is to 
establish an understanding of the goals and objec,tives of the United 
States as they related to the Middle East. An attempt also will be made 
to analyze the policies followed by Mr. Dulles during the Suez Crisis of 
1956 to determine whether they fulfilled higher goals and objectives., It 
is hoped that a realistic evaluation of his policies during this period 
can be constructed. 
In viewing the conduct of foreign affairs it seems that national 
values, aspirations, or goals must be arranged in some hierarchy of de-
sirability. It further appears that in the interest of developing an 
effective and orderly general policy, those values lower on the scale of 
desirability must complement the higher ones. For example, if peace is 
valued more highly than the acquisition of territory, additional terri-
tory must be acquired peacefully. The policy formulated to acquire the 
territory can then be said to have successfully contributed to the higher 
goal of peace. 
For the purpose of this study a variation of a hierarchy presented 
by Charles o. Lerche, Jr. will be used. 4 It also will serve to standard-
ize terminology. 
Goals - Relatively long-ranged and fixed aspirations which in-
teract to produce a formula of national interest. 
Objectives - A formulation of goals applied to middle-range 
and evolving conditions. 
Policies - The application of objectives analyzed in terms of 
4Charles o. Lerche, Jr., Foreign Policy of the American People, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 19585, p. 6. ~----
3 
short range and immediate conditions. 
Actions - The application of policy. 
With these definitions it can be ~easoned that actions are taken to 
implement policy; policies are the sum of the actions taken to attain 
objectives and goals. Objectives and goals are set to attain that which 
is considered to be best for a nation or to best serve its national 
interest. It is realized that the relationship among values changes as 
conditions change. For example, Great Britain's goal of peace finally 
came to have lower value than the prospect of Hitler becoming the master 
of Europe. However, some stability does exist at the higher levels of 
aspiration. Peace, again as an example, can be an enduring goal. 
In theory it should be possible to measure the success of policies 
by whether or not they compliment the higher, more stable objectives and 
goals. For the purpose of this study it will not be necessary to make a 
final delineation between objectives and goals and between goals and 
national interest, if in fact it were possible to do so. All, by defini-
tion, are of a higher order than policy, and policy should be conceived 
and conducted within the parameters set by them. Based upon available 
evidence, it can be assumed that the criteria which the policies of Mr. 
Dulles had to meet in relation to the Suez Crisis were peace and justice. 
In the State of the Union Message which President Eisenhower read to Con-
gress on January 5, 1956, peace and justice were stressed: "Our world 
policy and our actions are dedicated to the achievement of peace with 
justice for all nations. 115 Peace with justice, then, would appear to be 
5u. s. Department of State, American Foreign Policy: Current Docu-
ments., 195.6, (Washington: u. S. Government Printing Office, 1959), p. l. 
a goal of the Eisenhower Administration, and unless conditions warranted 
changing this goal all policies would have to defer it. 
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A second factor which apparently circumscribed policy was the con-
tainment of the Communist Power bloc, Shortly after the defeat of Hitler 
the Soviet Union came to be regarded as the major threat to the peace and 
well-being of the United States. The Democratic Administration under 
President Truman had created NATO in order to contain the further spread 
of Communist power. The Republican Administration sought to extend the 
ring of containment. In his 1956 State of the Union Address, the Presi-
dent acknowledged this goal by stating: "In the face of Communist mili-
tary power, we must of course, continue to maintain an effective system 
of collective security. 116 He then went on to note the gains made in ex-
tending the seal around the Bloc Nations. Containment, then, could be 
considered a national goal or objective. These two factors, peace with 
justice, and containment, appear to have formed the framework within 
which any particular policy or action must evolve. 
The specific actions that Secretary Dulles took in regard to the 
Suez Crisis were influenced by a third primary factor -- Arab National-
ism. For approximately 80 years French and British influence had domin-
ated the Middle East, However, by 1956 their power in the area had been 
slowly eroded by an ever increasing expression of Arab Nationalism. 
Nasser, President of Egypt, personified Arab Nationalism in many of its 
manifestations, He was able to unify Arabs around the theme of anti-
Israelism and anti-Colonialism. By pointing out the predominantly West-
ern backing of the State of Israel he was able to command much Arab 
6Ibid., p~ 2. 
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support for an anti-Western policy. Nationalism was a force to be reek-
oned with. Could it contain Communism as well as exclude Western domin-
ation? It appears that Dulles believed it could perform this vital func-
tion, for in early 1958 he said: "It Lthe United States Foreign Polici]" 
had unquestionably contributed to the steadfastness with which they and 
other states of the Near East resisted the campaign of intimidation and 
7 disruption conducted by the Soviet Union and it's agents." 
Another factor or dilemma which restricted choice of policy center-
ed around the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Many 
nations felt this to be a violation of an international agreement which 
was to run until 1968. More important, the British and French felt that 
the passage of ships through the Canal would be subject to the will of a 
single unfriendly man -- Gama! Abdel Nasser. The economies of these 
countries, as well as the economies of other Western European countries, 
were almost entirely dependent upon Middle Eastern oil. By controlling 
the Canal, Nasser, to a large extent, controlled the supply of European 
oil which was shipped via Suez. Great Britain and France felt that such 
a condition was an unacceptable threat to their well-being., and even sur-
vival as nations. The United States, by contrast, did not face an immed-
iate threat. The Canal and oil were not vital to our short range inter-
ests. How could Dulles protect the interests of, thes.e:, bulwarks of NATO 
and containment.without confronting Arab Nationalism .with armed force? 
What was justice in this dispute? 
Israel presented a similar dilemma. The Arab nations considered 
7 John Foster Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, February 39 1958, 
Eisenhower Papers, OF ll6LL, Eisenhower Liprary. 
the creation of Israel to be a threat to their well-being. an infringe-
ment upon their territory, and an instult to their stature. Yet Israel 
6 
·was a fact. The British. French and the United States were predominant 
in its creation and had little choice other than to support its existence. 
The Soviet Union took advantage of the anti-Western feeling which these 
conditions nourished and gave ne'arly unqualified support to Nasser. Arms 
which-the Communist Bloc furnished in 1955 lessened Nasser's dependence 
on the.West. 
These interwoven factors are evidence that ~he problems Dulles faced 
in the Middle East were extremely complicated. The actions he took to 
resolve the problems brought much adverse criticism, probably with justi-
fication. However, it appears that because of the complexity of the sit-
uation derogatory criticism was a predictable result and not necessarily 
an indication of failure so far as United States interests were concerned. 
- In pursuing the purpose of this study i.e., attempting to determine 
the actions that were taken and the purpose they served, 
assumptions are made: 
l. The primary goal of the United States during the Suez Crisis 
period was the maintenance of regional peace and stability. 
2. Containment of Communism or the exclusion of Communism from 
the Middle East was felt to be a corollary objective to the 
United States' goal of maintaining regional peace and 
stability. 
3. The improvement of relations with the Arab states so as to 
protect American political and economic interests in the 
Middle East was an objective of American foreign policy. 
4, It was concluded that Nasser was essential to the fulfillment 
of the United States' goal of peace and the objective of 
excluding Communism from the Middle East. 
These four assumptions lead to the following hypothesis: 
The policies of John Foster Dulles relative to the Suez 
Crisis of 1956 were consistant with the higher goals and ob-
jectives of the United States. 
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By analyzing the four assumptions and testing the hypothesis the 
study should reveal why the United States' goals and objectives relating 
to the Middle East were determined to be the ones which would best serve 
the interests of the United States. Secondly, the study should show what 
policies John Foster Dulles followed relative to the Suez Crisis of 1956, 
and thirdly, whether these policies fulfilled the purposes set forth in 
national goals and objectives. 
It was determined that the study could be most logically developed 
in chronological order. 
Chapter II presents the background. A short history of the Canal; 
Arab Nationalism and the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser to his position of 
leadership; the contemporary interests in the area of Great Britain, 
France and the Soviet Union; the United States' goals and objectives rel-
ative to the Middle East and the interests upon which they were based. 
Chapter III is primarily concerned with the policies and actions of 
Secretary of State Dulles during the Crisis period, 
The last chapter contains the conclusions reached from the analysis 
of the material covered in the study. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND 
On Thursday July 19, 1956, Mr. John Foster Dulles, Secretary of 
State of the United States, asked the Egyptian Ambassador in Washington, 
Mr. Ahmed Hussein, to come to his office. When he arrived Mr. Dulles 
handed him a letter which is purported by some writers to be the causal 
antecedent of the invasion of Egypt, by Israeli, British and French 
forces. The letter announced the withdrawal of the United States offer 
to grant $56 1 000,000 towards financing the construction of the High Dam 
at Aswan. It is true that -the withdrawal of these funds by John Foster 
Dulles was not without importance; however, it was important only as a 
single factor contributing to the crisis which was years in developing. 
Egypt's position at the junction of three continents was one other factor. 
A second, related to geography, placed Egypt astride the world's 
most important commercial artery -- the Suez Canal. A third was a crea-
tion of nature by which the world's major supply of oil was stored under 
the soils of the Middle East. The fourth clustered around political 
change~ the crumbling of colonial empires, the creation of the state of 
Israel, the attempts by the West, led by the United States, to exclude 
the USSR from the area. These interwoven conditions contributed to the 
rise of an emotional and sensitive feeling of Arab nationalism which, in 
turn, gave rise to Nasser and sustained him as the dominant figure in the 
Suez Canal Crisis of 1956. 
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The first concession act leading to the construction of the Suez 
Canal was signed in 1854 by Mohammed Said, Viceroy of Egypt. At that 
time, and.until World War I, Egypt was a province of the Ottoman Empire. 
She held an increasing position of privilege; however, all acts concern-
ing the concession made it clear that the conditions set forth were sub-
ject to approval by the Sultan. They also had to be in agreement with 
the Firmans which defined and limited the Egyptian Viceroy's power. 1 
This agreement of 1854. authorized Ferdinand de Lesseps to form the Com-
pagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez. A more definitive act was 
signed in 1856 which authorized construction and set forth the basic 
operation agreement. 2 Of particular significance in this latter act was 
the provision that the concession was to be for 99 years from the date 
the Canal was opened to shipping. 
The British Government resisted the Suez Project at every turn. It 
was afraid of French ambitions in the Middle East and feared that such a 
communication line would disturb British interests in the Middle and Far 
East. Lord Palmerston, Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister of Great 
Britain throughout most of the early period of the negotiations, offered 
stubborn resistance, _but in the end failed in his attempt to prevent the 
construction of the Canal. 
Shares in the new company were put on the market. De Lesseps 
envisioned that all Western powers would participate in financing the 
enterprise and.blocks of shares from the 400,000 total were allocated to 
1Benno Avram, The Evolution ~.!!!!,~Canal Status !!:2!!!, ~ ~ 
!2,. 1956 1 (Geneve 1 1958) 1 pp. 21-22. 
9 
2J. c. Hurewi tz I Diplomacy .!!:, !h!,. ~ 2 Middle ~: A Document-
ary Re~or~ 1 (Princeton, 1956) 1 I, 146-149. 
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each country. Palmerston, still determined to resist the project, de-
clined Britain's 80,000 shares; the United States refused 20,000 and 
Portugal and Denmark failed to respond to sizeable offers. The French 
people and Mohammed Said, the Egyptian ruler, subscribed to the rejected 
stock and thereby became the largest shareholders in the company. France 
with 207,160 shares dispersed widely among her people was the largest 
holder and the Egyptian Government with 177,642 shares was the second 
largest owner in the company. 3 
The Canal was not a political enterprise but a private company with 
its administrative office in Paris and its statutory office of registra-
tion in Alexandria. The board of thirty-two directors represented prin-
cipal nations and from the beginning included 11 non-French: one Ameri-
can, one.Austrian, one Portuguese, one Spaniard, one Russian, one English-
man, one Belgian, one Dutchman, one Egyptian and two Italians. 4 Regard-
less of the composition of shareholders or company officials, the Canal 
was not at that time regarded as having international status or personal-
ity.5 The Canal was formally opened on November 17, 1869. This date 
established that the concession would terminate on November 16, 1968. 
Viceroy Ismail, who succeeded Said, and de Lesseps honored the occasion 
3The remaining 14,300 shares were held by citizens of 17 other na-
tions. Hugh J. Schonfield, The Suez Canal in World Affairs, (New York, 
1953), p. 35. - -
4The Board of Directors were chosen at the General Assembly of Share-
holders which met annually. All shareholders possessing 25 shares had a 
right to vote but no shareholder was to have more than ten votes. This 
limit of 10 votes could account for but one Egyptian being on the Board 
as 177,642 of the 178,640 Egyptian shares were owned by one person, the 
Viceroy, and therefore equated to but 10 votes. 
5Andre Siegfried, Suez and Panama, tr H. H. and Deres Hemming, (New 
York, 1940), p. 78. ~~ 
with a show that has probably never been equaled for wild extravagance. 
The affair cost Ismail nearly five million dollars and helped plunge 
Egypt into bankruptcy. 6 
Great Britain, being unable to prevent construction of the artery, 
quite naturally, because of her world wide empire, became its greatest 
ll 
user. Her primary interest now became one of gaining control of the 
Canal and the reckless extra.vagances of Ismail provided the opportunity 
the British needed. 
When Ismail succeeded Said as Viceroy in 1863 Egypt was financially 
solvent. In 1872 the Sublime Porte granted Ismail the authority to con-
tract debts, in the name of Egypt, and the Khedive7 began borrowing money 
without restraint. His spending was equally unrestrained. 
The Khedive mortgaged Egypt's title to lS percent of the Canal roy-
alties and then sold the mortgage. He next put Egypt's 44 percent of 
the Canal Company on the block and Disraeli, Prime Minister of Great 
Britain, eagerly purchased the shares. Egypt, by way of irresponsible 
leadership, had squandered her economic interests in the Canal. 8 She 
had no right of ownership in the company nor title to a share in its 
profits.· The Government of Great Britain, by virtue of being the largest 
6For description of Canal's opening and the conspicious spending by 
the Viceroy to mark the occasion see William F. Longgood, ~ Story, 
(New York, 1957), pp. 52-58. 
7Ismail purchased the more honorific title, Khedive, and secured 
the right of succession by increasing Egypt's yearly tribute to Turkey 
from 376,000 to 720,000 pounds. 
8Nasser, on several occasions, told how Egypt was robbed of her 
Canal Company property. In his nationalization speech for example he 
said~ "Britain has forcibly grabbed our rights, our 44 percent of its 
shares". U. s. Department of State, The Suez Canal Problem: July 26 -
September 22, 1956, .. (Washington, 1956),p~. 
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single shareholdel" in the company. had gained an important degree of 
economic control and hence a place of great influence in regulating the 
company's activities. 
During this pel"iod Britain was adding to hel" empire and consolida-
ting her position in the Middle East. The Turkish Empire was slowly de-
teriorating and, by assuming the role of ally and friend, Britain obtain-
ed territory from the Sublime Porte. One such acquisition was Cyprus 
which was used in 1956 as a staging area from which to attack Egypt. 
A situation developed which gave Great Britain the opportunity to 
seize political control of Egypt, and Suez, the all important life line 
to her Asian and African Empire. Riots in Alexandria, occurring soon af-
ter a general revolt led by Ahmad Arabi, were sufficient pretext for 
British forces to occupy Egypt. This development, in 1882, left England 
in sole political control of Egypt and established her as the protector 
of the Suez Canal. Her occupation was of great significance in later 
years because it provided a cause upon which nationalism could focus. 
The Canal came to be regarded as the backbone of the British Empire. 
The serious regard in which it was held was demonstrated by a note sent 
to Russia at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877. The war made 
the protection of the Canal an immediate concern, Egypt was a part of 
the Turkish Empirei Russia, as a belligerent. had the right to occupy any 
portion of Turkey including Egypt. The British Government was determin-
ed to prevent interference with the lifeline of her empire. Brushing 
aside a French plan for neutralization of the Canal, Lord Derby sent a 
warning to Russia: 
Should the war now in progress unfortunately spread, 
interests may be imperilled which they /the British Govern-
ment7 are equally bound and determined to defend• and it is -
desirable that they should make it clear, so far as at the 
outset of the war can be done, what the most prominent of 
those interests are. 
Foremost among them is the necessity of keeping open, 
uninjured and uninterrupted 1 the communication between Eu-
rope and the East by the Suez Canal, An attempt to block-
ade or otherwise to interfere with the Canal or its approach-
es would be regarded by them as a menace to India, and as a 
grave injury to the commerce of the world. On both these 
grounds any such step -- which they hope and fully believe 
there is no intention on the part of either belligerent to 
take -- would be inconsistent with the maintenance by them 
of an attitude of passive neutrality. 9 
To this warning Russia promptly replied: 
The Imperial Cabinet will neither blockade, nor inter-
rupt, nor in any way menace the navigation in the Suez Canal. 
They consider the Canal as an international work, in which 
the commerce of the world is interested and which should be 
kept free from any attack,10 · 
The exchange of notes indicated a determined attitude on the part 
of Great Britain to protect her Canal interests and illustrates the 
rather popular confusion that developed as to the legal status of the 
Canal. The terms neutralize and internationalize became common Canal 
adjectives with nations.,other than G?"eat Britain. 
After it was realized that the B?"itish intended to permanently oc-
cupy Egypt, France,11 Russia, and other powers pressed England for an 
understanding on the·Canal. France urged a neutralization of Egypt and 
13 
the withdrawal of British forces. Lord Granville agreed to neutralization 
of Egypt but would not agree to relinquish control of the Canal: "We can 
never agree to the Suez Canal being neutralized. No British Minister can 
9Parliament Paper.No. 21 1877 1 quoted in Cha?"les.Hallberg, The Suez 
Canal, (New York, 1931), p. 282. - -
10Gortchakoff to Derby, quoted in Ibid., p. 282-283. 
llrr,nce and Italy were invited to join the occupation but declined. 
14 
agree to this sea passage being closed to us in the event of war. 012 
The controversy between the British who had de facto control over 
the Canal and the other powers led to the signing of an agreement enti-
tled: The Convention 2E. !h! ~ Navigation ~.'!!!!.~Canal: European 
Powers ~ the Ottoman Empire ~ October l2,,. ~· 
The Convention provided that: 
l. The Canal was to be ever free and open, in time of 
war as in time of peace, to all ships of commerce 
or of war without distinction to flag. 
2. No attack was to be made against its free use. It 
was never to be occupied nor blocked. In time of 
war no hostilities would be permitted within three 
nautical miles of the Canal, its ports or facilities. 
3. Should the Canal become endangered Egypt was to en-
force the rules established by the Convention. 
4. The Convention was to be valid for all time. 13 
It is not difficult to see that the British retained their position 
of imposed guardianship. ·In matters of defense the Egyptian Government 
and Great Britain were one and the same. In taking cognizance of the 
world power structure the Convention provided a basis for stable canal 
operations for some seventy years under British guarantees. When the 
power structure changed Nasser nationalized the Canal and became the new 
guarantor of the 1888 Convention. The crisis that occurred in 1956 
centered on the Anglo-French refusal to accept Nasser in this role. 
12Lord Granville to Count Bismarck. Quoted in Hallberg~ p. 284. 
13Hurewitz, I, 202-205. 
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Egyptian resentment of the British dated from the day Great Britain 
occupied Egypt. After 19191 leaders such as Zaghlul and parties such as 
the Wafd demanded complete independence from Britain while the British 
w~re determined to protect the backbone of their Empire. It bad become 
an unpleasant reality that not only did the Canal no longer belong to 
Egyp~ but, instead, Egypt belonged to the Canal. Egyptians bitterly 
pointed out that they had no share in the C•nal. They realized that the 
Canal was on their own soil; they had supplied most of the manpower to 
build it and paid much of the cost and they were told that the imperial-
istic Westerners were suppressing them in o?'der to continue stealing that 
which was rightfully theirs.14 
Emotions were readily focused upon. the easily identifiable British •. 
The depth of resentment was expressed by Nasser as he reflected upon the 
past: 
Once I tried to find out the meaning of a chant which I 
had often shouted in my childhood, whenever I saw an airplane 
in the sky: "O, Almighty God, may disaster take the English!'' 
(Ya 'Azeez. Dahiya takhud al-Ingleez). Later I came to know 
that that phrase had come down to us from the days of the 
Mamelukes. Our forebears of that day had not used it against 
the English, but they used a similar one against the Turk: 
"O God, the Self-Revealing? Annihilate the Turk?" (Ya Rabb, 
Ya Mutajelle, Ahlik al-'Uthmanli). My use of it was but an 
adaptation of an old form to express a new feeling. The under-
lying constant continued the same, never changing. Only the 
name of the oppressor was different.15 
The event that put the fires of national11$D1 forever beyond British 
control was the creation of the state of Israel. The Balfour Declaration 
14 . 
Egypt regained some interest in the Canal Company. By 1953 she 
had bargained a 300,000 Egyptian pound annual payment and had levied a 
10 percent tax on all company dividends. Emil Lengyel, World Without 
End 9 (New York,. 1953)• p. 185. /' -
15Ga~,1 Abdul Nasser, Egypt's Liberation, (Washington, 1955), p. 65. 
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of November 1917,16 favoring a national Jewish home in Palestine, irri-
tated and antagonized the Arabs from 1917 until 1948. Then ultimate be-
trayal occurred. Israel -- created on Arab soil -- was recognized as a 
sovereign state. 
Egyptian Nationalists saw the newly created state of Israel as an 
enemy with whom they ,could engage in a straight out military conflict. 
The brothers of Islam volunteered for a holy war. King Farouk ordered 
his Egyptian Army into Palestine and persuaded other member countries of 
the Arab League to join.,. -The Arabs were blindly confident that the Jew-
ish intruders would be pushed into the sea. However, despite the fact 
that the hostility to Zionism was unanimous, efforts were disorganized 
and inadequate: 
What actually happened was one of the saddest, most frus-
trating chapters of modern Arab nationalism. No Arab army had 
any idea what the other was doing. The Egyptian army had some 
heavy equipment but was shockingly deficient in transport, com-
munications, and supply, elements so vital in modern war. 
Egyptian politicans had gotten rich buying defective arms cheap 
and selling them to the army, and now the soldiers on the Pal-
estine front paid the price. At the height of the fighting, 
the Engineer Corps was ordered to build a villa for King Far-
ouk in Gaza. The Egyptian forces were steadily driven back in 
the southern Negev region, until at the end they salvaged only 
the narrow Gaza coastal strip of what was to have been Arab 
Palestine. Around the Israeli perimeter, the Arab armies took 
a humiliating beating.17 
It was largely because of this defeat and humiliation that Nasser 
steeled himself to the overthrow of the Monarchy and to the expulsion of 
the British: "There was no need fighting foreign armies until the orig-
inal occupation was rooted out, Nasser realized he must follow the 
16Hurewitz, II, 26. 
17Wilton Wynn, Nasser .2!,Egypt, (Cambridge, Mass., 1959), p. 34. 
17 
example of Arabi and strike at the dynasty of Mehmet Ali."18 
In July 1952, a coup d 9 etat was ably executed. Once power was 
secured Nasser, the leading spirit of the movement, assumed his rightful 
role as leader. By guiding the tide of Egyptian nationalism against the 
occupying forces, the new Chief of State kept constant pressure on the 
. British and on October 19, 1954 Great Britain agreed to give up her last 
hold in Egypt •19 When,. the last British soldier left Egypt on June 18, 
195620 Nasser proclaimed a three day holiday and was adored by "scream-
ing semi-hysterical natives whose nationalistic ecstasy112l was under= 
standable. For the first time in hundreds of years Egypt was completely 
Egyptian. Nasser was her liberator and hero. 
"Violent nationalism11 22 was a dynamic force in the Middle East and 
one of the primary causes for the changes that erupted in the area. Afif 
Tannous, Chief 1 Africa and Middle East Analysis Branch, United States 
Department of Agriculture, notes: 
The Middle East has been changing at an accelerated rate • 
••• The process reached unprecedented intensity and compre-
hensiveness under the tremendous forces released or generated 
by World War II. Leading among these have been the spirit of 
nationalism.23 
18 Ibid. , p. 3 5. 
l 9"Agreement of the Government of the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland and the Egyptian Government Regarding the Suez Base." Quoted in 
D. c. Watts 1 ed. Bpitain and the Suez Canal: !!!!,. Background, (London, 
1956), p. 37-40. ---
20Five weeks later Nasser seized the Canal Company. 
21 Longgood, p. 125. 
22Elie Salem, "Problems of Arab Political Behavior", Tensions in the -------Middle East I ed. Philip W. Thayer, ( Bal timo;-~, Md. , 1958), p'. ~8. 
23Afif Tannous, "Commentary", in Thaye~, p. 163. 
This force, nationalism• p~ovided Nasser with a great source of 
power. The emotional dispute with Israel was a cause around which·the 
Arabs unified. Regardless of cleavages caused by dynastic rivalries or 
how much the "oil have not" states envied the "oil have" states, the 
18 
Arabs were one in their hatred of Israel. J. c. tturewitz recognized that 
one of the constants in the Arab-Israel zone has been the 
unifying effect upon the Arab countries of hostilities to 
Israel. Regardless of how Arab governments may differ on many 
issues, they always find common purpose in their contempt of 
the state that emerged in their midst against their firmly 
expressed wishes. This has been dramatically exhibited in 
recent cooperation of Jordan and Saudia Arabia with Egypt on 
the question of Aqaba at a time when Jordan was fighting for 
its very political existence, which was being undermined by 
Egyptian subversion, and King Saud had otherwise broken with 
Nasser over Egyptian efforts to weaken the monarch's hold on 
his kingdom.24 
Nasser largely controlled the force of nationalism through his lead-
ership of the Arabs in their dispute with Israel. This force was also 
easily focused against the West for two reasons: Western leadership in 
creating and sustaining Israel, and colonialism, a Western institution. 
A good summary of nationalism as a force and its orientation, in the 
l9SO's, was given by John c. Campbell: 
The winds of Arab Nationalism are blowing strong; Arab 
Nationalism seems to have been captured by Gamal Abdel Nasser; 
its tone is violently anti-Western; it welcomes the friendly 
support of the Soviet Union against the hated Colonialists 
and "Zionists". 
To command these winds to calm down is futile.25 
As other parts of this study will indicate, John Foster Dulles recog-
nized that Arab nationalism was a powerful force in the Middle East. From 
24Hurewitz 9 "Commentary", in Thayer, p. 21. 
25John· c. Campbell 9 "From Doctrine to Policy in the Middle East'', 
Foreign Affairs~ xx,cy, q9s1), p. 446. 
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1954 on Nasser largely controlled this force and was considered by Dulles 
to be the key to United States policy in that area. 
The Middle East was vitally important to the economy of France and 
Great Britain. Not only was it the commercial route to South East Africa 
and the Far East but the Middle East itself had come to represent a near 
life and death proposition in the form of oil: 
From the economic point of view, the Middle East con-
tains 70 percent of the world's known oil reserves. Middle 
East production normally supplies 20 percent of the oil used 
by the free world and 75 percent of Western Europe's oil 
imports.26 
Western Europe's need for oil had increased at an average rate of 
13 percent each year since 1947. The oil required for the year 1956 was 
125 million tons.27 The importance of a guarantee that this oil could 
be delivere4 had a great impact on thinking in Great Britain and France. 
A shortage of oil would cause great damage to these highly industrialized 
nations and was simply not to be threatened. Nasser never became a real 
threat to the oil producing centers although he had grandiose dreams of 
using Arab oil as the economic power behind a United Arab World. 28 How-
ever the source of oil was not the entire problem. Transporting it from 
the Middle East to the dependent industries of Europe was a vital factor. 
The availability and serviceability of the Canal, which Nasser now con-
trolled and the availability of tankers were the variables. 
In 1956 oil was being delivered by two major routes -- tankers via 
2611committee Analysis of the Problem", Congressional Digest, XXXVI, 
(1957), P• 68. 
27George Lenczowski, Oil and State in the Middle East, (Ithaca, 1960), ...................... -- ._ 
PP• 28-29. 
28Nasser, pp. 100~109. 
20 
the Suez Canal, which carried 65 million tons per year, and tankers which 
loaded at the Mediterranean terminals of the oil pipelines, which carried 
36 million tons per year. The remainder of the Western European require-
ment 1 24 million tons, came from the Western Hemisphere. The Canal and 
the pipelines permitted delivery of an additional 12 million tons which 
went to Africa and the Americas. 29 
The second portion of the transportation problem was the inadequacy 
of the tanker fleet to supply Europe's needs should the Canal and the 
pipelines be closed. In 1956 the tanker fleet30 numbering some 2,850 
units was fully employed. About 25 percent delivered oil to the United 
States, about 50 percent transported oil to Europe, and the remainder 
were employed in other movements. There were no other tankers except 
for the United States Reserve Fleet, comprising some fifty ships which 
were retired at the end of World War rr. 31 
Although there were alternatives to transporting through the Suez 
Canal they were not within Anglo-French capability for a sustained period 
of time. Tankers could deliver via the Cape, but this meant a delay of 
at least two weeks. The distance from London to Kuwait and Abadan via 
Suez is approximately 6,500 miles whi.le via the Cape it is nearly doubl-
ed, 11,300 miles. The increase in time needed for the journey would re= 
duce the available oil supply to 60 percent of the amount deliverable 
29Lenczowski, pp. 30"'131. 
30communist Block tankers were insignificant in tonnage and cer-
tainly not available to the West. 
31Lenczowski, p. 33 •. 
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through the Suez. 32 In this contingency Western Europe would be forced 
to look toward other, primarily Western Hemisphere, sources. This al-
ternative was not desirable because it would be a drain on hard currency, 
would result in a drastic increase in cost, and would be dependent upon 
securing additional tanker space for tansportation. These bleak pros-
pects greatly excited Anglo-French fears when the Canal was nationalized. 
France's argument with Nasser was not limited to the Canal or oil. 
The Egyptian Chief of State was openly anti-Colonialist and nearly as 
open in his support of the Algerian Rebels. Nasser plagued France at 
every opportunity and was regarded as a major source of trouble. His 
support of the rebels made him and Algeria an inseparable problem: 
No ambivalence characterized the French official view of 
Nasser of the Suez issue. In the Egyptian dictator Mollet saw 
the reincarnation of Hitler. Nasser's philosophy of Revolu-
tion recalled Mein Kampf •••• Pineau said Nasser had broken his 
word and Lacoste believed the slightest weakness vis-a-vis 
Egypt could bring disaster to Algeria.33 
The interests of the USSR in the Middle East were primarily politi-
cal. Ernest K. Lindley notes: "The Soviet interest in the Middle East 
••• is short of vital ••• the Soviet Union does not need the Middle East 
in order to survive or continue its industrial growth. 1134 So far as her 
oil needs were concerned the evidence is conflicting. Heinrich Hassmann 
intimates that the USSR was keenly interested in the Middle East as a 
source of oil: 
32rbid., p. 326-7. 
33Richard and \Joan Brace, Ordeal.!!.:. Algeria, (Princeton, 1960), 
PP• 140-141. 
34Er;nest K. Lindley, "Concluding Comments", in Thayer, p. 326 
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This rich oil area lies on Russia's immediate doorstep. 
All the problems of the Soviet oil industry -- the supply 
difficulties and the oil bottlenecks -- would be solved at 
one stroke and eliminated forever if the Soviet Union suc-
ceeded i~ getting a foothold in the Middle East or became 
a dominating power.35 
By contrast, Benjamin Shwadran pointed out that Russian exports of 
oil 1 116,000 ba:1:'!'els daily in 1956, was evidence "that would clearly im-
_ply that the USSR does not need Middle East oil for its own purposes or 
even for needs of the Communist bloc. 1136 Regardless of these contrast-
ing views, it is beyond serious questioning that in case of a major war 
the Soviet Union would need oil, and more impQrtant perhaps, would want 
to deny it to the West. However, her more serious interests in the Mid-
dle East can be better explained within the context of the cold war. 
"The year 1955 will enter history, as it now appears, as the year 
Russia re .. emerged as a major Middle East power."37 Why she waited so 
long has its main significance in the fact that when she did re-enter it 
was as a new personality quite untarnished by prior contact. 
Western pX'oximity and Western behavior permitted friction and fanned 
Arab resentment. To many Arab leaders the danger of Communism as compar-
ed to Western colonialism was non-existant, A. v. Sherman states that 
the Communist of fez, had much appeal to ... some Arab leaders, The offer 
not only promised membership in a powerful club which 
gave military and political backing and apparently asked 
nothing in return: it taugbt valuable new techniques for 
35Henrich Hassmann, Oil In The Soviet Union, (Princeton, 1953), p. 
141 1 tr o Alfred M. LeestoO:- - -
36Benjamin Shwadran, The Middle East Oil and the Great Powers: 
2d ed. revised, (New York 1l959) 1 p. ii's6':"- - -
37walter z. Laqueur. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, -- -- -(New York, 1956) 1 p. 260. 
manipulation of masses and for winning sympathies among 
certain well-meaning groups in the West. It produced an 
excellent new justification and guiding lines for bureau-
cratic anti-capitalism of the old style •••• In short, the 
new radical movement which had been in search of a pro-
gram found itself being offered one which suited its mood 
perfectly, yet without demanding the reorientation of 
loyalties which Communism demands in the West.38 
In reaction to Stalin's post World War II policy in Eastern Europe 
and Greece, western countries, led by the United States, tried to seal 
Communism within its existing borders. The Truman Doctrine followed by 
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NATO and the Baghdad Pact represented such attempts. Following Stalin's 
death, Soviet tactics changed. There was an attempt to alter the image 
of the USSR from the threatening recluse to the bountiful friend. In 
referring to this change in policy Walter z. Laqueur states: 
In the Middle East, in particular, Communism has been 
radically purged of those elements that might be distaste-
ful to the present generation of nationalists. It ceased 
to rely on slogans borrowed from Western democracy, the 
rights of man, and internationalism (obligatory for use 
in countries with liberal traditions) and spoke instead 
in terms of nationalism, military power, and economic 
aid. 39 
Walter Laqueur further states that the Soviet political offensive 
in the Middle East may have taken some western leaders by surprise.40 
Dulles was most certainly surprised at the USSR's economic offensive. 
The Secretary probably expected that attempts to penetrate the Middle 
East would follow the conventional pattern; propaganda and subversion of 
· government via local communis''t groups~. Instead the USSR offered friend-
38A. v. Sherman quoted by Walter z. Laqueur, "The Prospects of Com-
munism in the Middle East", in Thayer, p. 299. 
39Ibid., p. 299 0 
40Ibid. 
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ship and support to Nasser and largely brushed aside the Egyptian Commun-
ist Party. The crisis that soon followed could not have reached the pro-
portions it did without the Soviet support of Nasser. The importance of 
the backing is well stated by c. Grover Haines: 
The alignment of the Soviet Union with the Arab anti-
Western nationalists and, in particular, with Nasser in the 
face of France-British weakness and American irresolution 
emboldened Nasser to defy the Western powers openly. Of 
all the elements that entered into the decision to national-
ize the Suez Canal Company and thus to precipitate one of 
the most serious crises since World War II, the assurance of 
Soviet support was certainly the most important.41 
No doubt the Moscow leaders would have liked to communize the Mid-
dle East and to have made it subject to thei~ control. This was not 
., 
possible as an immediate goal and, if attempted, would have risked los-
ing a great opportunity. However, if the USSR could properly manipulate 
the anti-Israeli and anti-Western feelings she could embarass, weaken, 
and possibly divide the NATO allies. The least she could have expected 
was to see Western influence greatly reduced in Arab countries which 
would give a correspondingly greater opportunity for the Soviet Union to 
win approval in the area. The implications of the Soviet Union gaining 
stature in the Middle East were not lost on Dulles. It appears that he 
believed Arab nationalism-and the Arab leadership would preclude Soviet 
dictation of Middle, Eastern affaiX!s.; ·· The.· S~cr.etary of State was able to 
formulate policy based upon this · .. belief because the, organization of the 
Republican Administration left him largely responsible·for conducting 
foreign affairs. 
Eisenhower came to the White House with a military man's view of 
41c. Grover Haines, "Commentary", in Thayer, pp. 64-65. 
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organization ~nd administration and quite naturally brought to the Presi-
dency the concept of staff structure with which he had worked for many 
years. 42 His creation of a staff system provided for a fixed order and 
sequence of procedures from the President on down. The departmentaliza-
tion which President Eisenhower embodied in his organization provided 
for the assignment of functions and decisions of a routine nature to his 
staff. With the type of an organization which evolved, the presiden~ was 
left free to concentrate his energy where he felt it was most needed. 43 
President Eisenhower did not regard this delegation of authority as 
an abdication of his powers but as the sharing of authority with those 
around him. This approach reflected his basic attitude towards govern-
ment. He believed that the democratic process called for a diffusion of 
power and, because of this concept, he did not want to be the final ar-
biter of policy. While he did not allow major decisions to be taken out 
of his hands, he refused to use his power arbitrarily. 44 
The President regarded his job as having four parts: Chief of State, 
Head of Government, Ceremonial Chief of State, and Head of the Republi-
can Party. The role important to this study, Chief of State, was defined 
by Merriman Smith as being "largely concerned with foreign affairs policy 
which the President determines and turns over to the Secretary of State 
for execution. 1145 Robert Murphy notes: "The President behaved like the 
Chairman of the Board, leaving it to his Secretary LDulle!J' to handle 
42Merriman Smith, Meet Mister Eisenhower, (New York, 1955), p. 124. - --·-- ------
43 • · Ibid.• p. 96. 
44Merlo J. Pusey, Eisenhower !,h!:. President, (New York, 1956), p. 286. 
45smith, p. 298. 
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details, and later acted as a buffer so far as the public was concern-
With such a decentralized arrangement both the President and the 
Secretary of State were important personalities in determining the goals, 
objectives, and policies of the United States. Therefore, a brief re-
view of some aspects of the personal philosophy of each of these key de-
cision-makers which relate to the interests of the United States will be 
relevant to this study. 
The paramount goal of President Eisenhower was one of establishing 
and maintaining peace. Mr. Pusey, a biographer, described this predis-
position by w~iting: 
It may be truly said of Eisenhower that he is a man of 
peace by instinct, training, conviction, and experience. 
He refuses to regard any people as an enemy. He looks upon 
war as the greatest catastrophe other than the loss of free-
dom, that can befall any country. Consequently, he refuses 
to use war as an instrument of policy, except as a last re-
sort to save our way of life from threatened destruction. 47 
The President's actions as well as his public statements from his 
election campaign in 1951 to the day of the Suez Crisis reflected his 
genuine and sincere concern for peace, 48 
President Eisenhower's relations with Congress followed the tradi-
tionalist's conception of the separation of powers. By adhering to this 
concept he shielded himself from being considered reckless in the conduct 
of foreign affairs. His actions during the Formosan Straits Crisis of 
46Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, (Garden City, 1964), pp. 
383-384. 
47Pusey, p. 86. 
48 ror examples of statements concerning peace see Dwight D. Eisen-
hower, Peace With J~stice, (New York, 1961), pp. 30 1 80-90, 102-103. ---. ' . ·. 
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1958 were permitted by a congressional resolution passed in 1955.49 The 
Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East was also preceded by Congress-
ional approvai. 50 It was important to him to act constitutionally in 
foreign affairs. Secretary Dulles noted this predisposition at a press 
conference. A reporter asked: 
Mr. Secretary ••• how do you interpret the May 25, 1950 
/Tripartite7 declaration so far as it may involve the use of - - . our own troops? Are you free for example, without Congress-
ional sanction?Sl 
The Secretary responded: 
Whether we are. free or not is a constituional question. 
It is strongly the disposition of President Eisenhower ••• to 
resolve all of these doubts in favor of going to Congress.52 
The goal of peace53 set the boundaries within which John Foster 
Dulles would "handle details1i54 of United States foreign policy. How-
ever the Secretary, like President Eisenhower, had a firm conviction 
that peace was the essential substructure of American policy. Dulles 
once said: ''I want to make my life count for something in the world for 
peac~'.~ '155 H~· thought that the United States should actively wage peace 
;·:::'·· 
49 Peter v. Curl, ed.,. Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955, 
(New York, 1956) 1 p. 298. 
50ibid., 1957, p. 204. 
51New York Times, April 4, 1956 1 p. 8. -----
52Ibid. 
53some writers intimate that Eisenhower would not have been so in-
tent on maintaining peace at the time of the Suez Crisis if it had not 
occurred at election time. This supposition is difficult to prove. Cer-
tainly his actions prior to that time could not be offered as evidence. 
54Murphy, pp. 383-384. 
55Deane and Davis Heller, John Foster Dulles: Soldier~ Peace, 
(New York, 1960) 1 p. 32. ~ 
just as diligently as wars are waged: 
It is a task that requires an effort like the one required 
to win a great war. 
Why should we not make that effort? 
can portray the awful horror of World War 
not, for the averting of war, develop and 
would be evoked in the effort to win war? 
Neither voice nor pen 
III. Why should we 
use the qualities that 
While we are yet at peace, let us mobilize the potentiali-
ties ••• which we usually reserve for war •••• 
No one will be able to win the next war.56 
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The force against which America needed to pit its strength was Com-
munism which Mr. Dulles intently disliked and distrusted: 
First, it is necessary to know who generates the enmity 
that poisons the atmosphere in which we live •••• The"enemy" 
== the self proclaimed enemy -- is the relatively small, 
fanatical Soviet Communist Party •••• its leader, and the Po-
litburo is the principle source of the decisions which com-
mand the blind obedience of the hard core of loyal Communist 
Party members everywhere in the world.57 
The Secreatary largely believed in the monolithic state of Commun-
ism. That is, all Communists and all Communist nations are subjects of 
Moscow and Moscow is the director and nerve center of the blue print for 
a world under Communist rule: "These party members have despotic-politi-
cal power in Russia and elsewhere. They believe that it is their duty to 
extend that power to all the world. 11 58 
Dulles was very dogmatic in his dislike of Communism and expected 
everyone who was not a Communist to share his view. There was no middle 
gro1,1nd. A person was either against evil or he was for it. The depth 
of his feeling is shown by the low esteem in which he held Neutrals. In 
Mr. Dulles words: 
56John Foster Dulles,~~ Peace, (New York, 1957), pp. 3-4. 
57Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
58Ibid. 
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The principle of neutrality ••• pretends that a nation can 
best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate 
of others. This has increasingly become an obsolete concep-
tion, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it 
is an immoral and shortsighted conception. 59 
The Secretary learned to live with Neutrals; however, his contemptu-
ous regard for the non-belligerents illustrates the zeal with which he 
conducted his battle.against the evils of Communism. 
Secretary of State, Dulles, was a moralist but he was also a real-
ist. The Middle East was of material and strategic importance to the 
United States. In March 1953 1 shortly after assuming office, Mr. Dulles 
made an orientation tour of the Middle East. Upon his return he made a 
report which can be used as a guide for analyzing the importance of the 
area to the United States. 
His first point concerned the strategic location of the area: "The 
Near East possesses great strategic importance as the bridge between Eu-
rope, Asia and Africa. 1160 The Middle East served, and yet serves, as a 
link between Europe, Asia and Africa. Much of the flow of traffic from 
the Eastern Americas to these areas is also th?'ough the Arab countries. 
The principal air routes converge on the Middle East as do the sea lanes. 
The area facilitates communications; however, it can equally well serve 
as a barrier petween the continents and oceans of the world. If the USSR 
could control the region in a world conflict it would have a tremendous 
advantage over its opponent in land, naval, and air operations. It would 
.. 
dominate the shortest routes between Europe and the Afro-Asian continents. 
With the continuing growth of the industrial complex of Europe and its 
59u. s., Department .2!. State Bulletin, XXXIV, (June 18, 1956), pp. 
999-1000. 
60oepartment 2,!. State Bulletin, XXVII!, (June 15 1 1953), p. 831. 
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demand for Arab oil and other resources of Africa and the Middle East, 
the region, as a communications center, becomes vitally important. From 
a military point of view, if the Soviet Union could gain sufficient in-
fluence in the area she would outflank the Baghdad Pact Nations and NATO. 
The New York Times summed up the vital nature of the area in November ....................... 
1956: 
It is perfectly clear whaf:the Soviets stand ta gain in 
their struggle with Western powers if they can gain a foot-
hold in the Mediterranean. Even.if they do no more than make 
a military alliance with Egypt and/or Syria, with a right to 
establish air and naval bases in the area in time of trouble 
they would outflank the NATO alliance and provide a constant 
threat to the oil supplies and communications of the Western 
powers. 61 
Mr. Dulles next mentioned the resourcesof the Middle East: 
This area contains important resources vital to our 
welfare -- oil, manganese, chrome, mica and other minerals. 
About 60 percent of the proven oil reserves of the world 
are in. the·Near East.62 
"Vital to ourwelfare1163 may have been ~oo st:rong an expression 
relative to the.United States' immediate dependency upon these re-
sourcest however, in another sense they were indeed vital. Admiral 
Libby, USN,64 ~aw control of Middle East.resou:r:-ces as the factor which 
could determine the outcome of the East~~est conflict, According to him 
there weI'e three great industrial economic groupings in the world. The 
United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union. Western Europe 
61New York. Times, November 18, 1956, p. l2E. -----
62n . f S B ' (J 3) 8 epartment 2._· tate ulletin, XXVIII, une 15, 195 , p. 31. 
63 Ibid, 
64Rughven E. Libby, ''Strategic Military Importance of the Middle 
East", in Thayer, pp. 38-40. 
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with 200 9 000 9 000 skilled people and a modern industrial complex was the 
factor which retained the balance of power for the West. It was obvious 
that splitting Western Europe from the United States. with Western Europe 
adopting a neutralist or pro-Soviet position. would drastically reduce 
or destroy the economic-industrial superiority which the United States 
and its allies enjoyed. Admiral Libby asked: "What more logical move 
is open to the Soviet Union than to use the Middle East as the lever with 
which to accomplish this separation?116S 
The Admiral answered the question by showing what might be a logical 
result of Soviet influence in the Middle East: 
The extension of Soviet influence over Syria and Egypt is 
a clear warning to the West that the vital flow of petroleum 
could be stopped ••• at the whim of the Kremlin. This threat in 
itself 9 particularily if accompanied by occasional stoppages 
••• could have a most disruptive effect upon the industry of 
Western Europe. It could be used, carrot and stick fashion, 
to force ••• Europe ••• to purchase its requirements from Soviet 
-- controlled sources -- at Soviet prices -- expressed in 
terms of political concessions.66 
Whether or not the USSR would be able to split the United States 
from its allies by controlling Middle East oil is not beyond question-
ing. However, the State Department was aware that oil was extremely vi-
tal to the West. Henry A. Byroade, Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs, saidi "Without that oil the industries of our allies 
would be paralyzed and our own would be overworked, 11 67 
By the time the Suez Crisis occurred foreign oil had become a huge 
business in the United States. Spurred by the profit motive and periodic 
65Ibid,, p. 39. 
66Ibid. 
67Byroade, Henry A., The Middle East. (Washington, 1954), p. 3. 
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scares of domestic shortages, American oil firms searched the globe for 
exploitable reserves. By 1953 American investments in oil operations 
abroad ranked second only to United States investments in manufacturing. 
Of the $14 1 800,000,000 total, $4 1 600,000,000 or 29 percent, comprised 
money spent by American oil·companies for the production, transportation, 
refining, and marketing of oi1. 68 
The investment was large in the Middle East and the promise of mone-
tary reward was also large. By the end of 1953, American firms owned 
shares in 60.l percent of all known Middle East reserves. 69 These re-
serves were estimated at 79 billion barrels. 70 American shared wells in 
the Middle East produced at the rate of 1,456,800 barrels per day. 71 
Wayne A. Leeman, Professor of Economics, University of Missouri, made a 
study of oil profits for the years 1955 through 1958. His calculations 
show that oil companies made an average net profit of $.82 per barrel on 
Middle East oil during these years.72 Using his figures, the 79 billion 
barrel reserve represented some $64 1 780,000,000 that would be returned 
to American investors over the years. 73 
68Leonard M. Fanning, Foreign 2.!.!. ~~~World, (New York, 
1954), p. 8. 
69Ibid., p. 354. 
70Ibid. Fanningvs estimates and statistics are verified in Charles 
W. Hamilton, Americans and Oil in the Middle East, (Houston, 1962) and 
in Wayne A. Leeman, The~ic'e""of°"Middle East Oil, (Cornell, 1962). --· - --
7lranning, p. 354. 
72Leeman, p. 65. 
73some writers estimate the profits much higher pointing out, with-
out offering proof, that the cost of production was from $.15 to $.25 per 
b~rrel. Professor Leeman's study would indicate that this was a lifting 
cost only. 
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There certainly was no conflict between policies formulated by the 
State Department and those which the oil companies desiredo The degree 
of influence the latter had on Middle Eastern policy is difficult to 
determine, but is seems that a close relationship existed between the 
Department of State and oil interests. As an example, Herbert Hoover, 
Jr., Under Secretary of State to Mr. Dulles, wrote the foreward of a book 
published by the Gulf Publishing Company.74 He introduced the author as 
"an executive in one of the largest American oil companies1175 who had a 
"penetrating awareness of the economic, political and social forces which 
t around hl'm. 117 6 were presen Mr. Hamilton, the executive, indicated that 
oil concessions and diplomacy were closely related: 
Thus in 30 odd years, by negotiation and by search and 
development, the American share of recoverable oil in the 
Middle East underground has risen from nothing to more than 
1.7 times the estimated reserves in all the countries of the 
Western Hemisphere -- which is no mean credit to American 
diplomacy and free industrial enterprise.77 
Cooperation should have been expected when interests were compli-
mentary. Both wanted peace in the Middle East -- the oil companies, so 
they could profitably exploit the oil in the area, and the State Depart= 
ment, which realized oil was of vital importance to the United States 
and the Western World. 
If the industries of Western-Europe were to cease production the 
Cold War could be lost to the Soviet Bloc. If the West was to remain 
74Charles W. Hamilton, Americans ~ Oil in~ Middle ~, 
(Houston, 1962), p. v. 
75Ibid. 
76Ibid. 
77rbid., p. 270. 
strong and vigorous, it had to assure itself of access to the resources 
of the Middle East. It would have to assure itself freedom of transit 
through the Suez Canal in order to deliver the vital oil to the indus-
tries of Western Europe. It was incumbent upon the United States, as 
leader of the Free World, to determine how this should be accomplished. 
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The goal of peace then was not only dictated by the moral values of 
President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, but also because 
peace would best serve the national and economic interests of the United 
States. 
CHAPTER III 
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THE CRISIS AND U.S. POLICIES 
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When Secretary of State Dulles took office early in 1953, he assum-
ed with the office, the policies, objectives, and goals formulated by 
the Truman Administration. Mr. Dulles made no abrupt changes, but did 
shift the area of emphasis from Europe, where NATO was well established, 
to other areas of the world. He was aware that a Soviet interest in the 
Middle East was stirring. As early as April 1953 he noted: "The pres-
ent masters of the Kremlin,. ,covet this /Middle Easy position. 111 
He believed that Arab Nationalism had become a powerful force and 
indicated that it would be in the best interests of the United States to 
make this force a friendly one: 
It is high time ~hat the United States Government paid 
more attention to the Middle East., •• Our postwar attention 
has been primarily given to Western Europe. That area was 
and is very important, but not all important •••• 
These people we visited are proud people who ••• have a 
great future. We in the United States will be better off 
if we respect and honor them and learn the thoughts and 
aspirations that move them •••• We cannot afford to be dis-
trusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of free-
dom.2 
An immediate dilemma that confronted the Secretary was caused by the 
ties the United States had with the colonial powers, Great Britain and 
1Department of State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 15, 1953), p. 831. 
2 Ibid., pp. 834-835. 
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France. In his words; 
Most of the peoples of the Near East ••• are deeply con-
cerned about political independence for themselves and others. 
They are suspicious of the colonial powers. The United 
States is too suspect because, it is reasoned, our NATO 
alliance with France and Britain requires us to try to pre-
serve or restore the old colonial interests of our allies. 
I am convinced that United States policy has become un-
necessarily ambiguous in this matter •••• it would be disaster 
if there were any break between the United States and Great 
Britain and France. However, without breaking from the 
framework of Western unity, we can pursue our traditional 
dedication to political liberty,3 
On October 2, 1956 Secretary Dulles voiced an opinion that the 
United States should no longer support a colonial power against those 
struggling for independence: 
There is in Asia and Africa the so called problem of 
colonialism. Now there the United States plays a somewhat 
independent role •••• You have this very big problem of the 
shift from colonialism to independence •••• ! believe the 
role of the United States is to try to see that the pro-
cess moves forward in a constructive evolutionary way. 4 
It is difficult to determine the degree of influence Dulles had in 
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the negotiations when the British gave up part of their interests in the 
Middle East. He was apparently pleased when Britain left the Sudan. He 
noted the occasion by saying: "It is in the best tradition of British 
regard for the orderly political evolution of a people toward self= 
government. 11 5 
He apparently helped to ease the British out of the Suez bases and 
again commented on the negotiations: 
3Ibid., p. 834. 
4American Foreign Policy, Current Documents: 1956, p. 41. 
5Department 2£.. State Bulletin, XXVIII, (February 23, 1953), pp. 
305=306. 
The signing of the final agreement between Egypt and the 
United Kingdom on the Suez Base is an event of far reaching 
importance and an occasion for renewed congratulations to both 
countries •••• Egypt now assumes new and fuller responsibilitiesv--
as the military base in the Suez Canal Zone passes from Brit-
ish to Egyptian control.6 
Dulles never lost sight of the nationalistic forces that dominated 
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the Middle East. Goold-Adams quotes the Secretary of State as saying:,?" 
"To oppose nationalism is counter-productive. 117 Herman Finer states that 
the Secretary applied extreme pressure on the British to meet Nasser's 
terms for evacuating the Suez Base, even going so far as to assure the 
British they would get no help from the United States should Nasser at-
tack them.8 
It therefore appears conclusive that the Secretary of State had de-
cided that United States interests could best be protected within the 
framework of Arab independence. It further appears that he supported 
the demands of nationalism to the extent he was able to do so and still 
retain his NATO allies as the bulwark of the containment policy. 
The second dilemma with which Mr. Dulles had to contend was the Arab 
reaction to the support given to Israel by the United States. President 
Truman was a leader in the fight to create the Jewish State. In 1946 he 
restated an earlier request that he wanted to see "one hundred thousand 
Jews admitted to Palestine."9 When the partition plan was submitted at 
6Department of State, American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, II, 
p. 2226. 
7Richard Goold-Adams, The Time of Power, (London, 1962), p. 203. ------· 
8Finer, p. 16 and footnote 9, p. 514. 
9Harry s. Truman, Years~ Trial~ Hope, (Garden City, 1956), 
p. 154. 
the United Nations, Mr. Truman noted: 
The Arabs' reaction was quite plain: They did not like 
it. They made it clear that partition would not be carried 
out except over their forceful opposition. 
I inst6'1cted the State Department to support the parti-
tion plan. 
His determined efforts did not waver and, when Israel proclaimed 
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independence on May l~, 1948, President Truman recognized the new state 
immediately. In his words: 
Exactly eleven minutes after Israel had been proclaimed ,// 
a state Charlie Ross, my press secretary, handed the press the 
announcement of the de facto recognition by the United States 
of the provisional government of Israe1,ll 
Such acts could only be considered unfriendly by the Arab nations and no 
doubt the enmity which they created persisted to harass Dulles. He felt 
this ill feeling toward the United States when he visited the Middle East 
in 1953 and sought ways to overcome it. However, Israel was a state in 
fact and could not be abandoned. The· Secretary felt that in the circum-
stances the best policy to follow in regard to the Arab-Israeli dispute 
was one of impartiality. He voiced this by saying: 
Today the United States should seek to allay the deep re-
sentment against it that resulted from the creation of Israel • 
••• The Arab people are afraid the United States will back the 
new State of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more 
fearful of Zionism than Communism. 
On the other hand the Israeli fear that ultimately the 
Arabs may try to push them into the sea •••• 
The United States policy should be impartial so as to win. 
not only the respect and regard of the Israeli but also of the 
Arab people. We shall seek such policies.12 
Dulles immediately emphasized to the Arabs that the United States 
lOibid., P• 155. 
11Ibid •• p. 164. The USSR extended recognition the following day. 
l 2neRartment ~ State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 15, 1953), p. 834. 
39 
was committed to protect them from an Israeli assault upon their terri-
tory by the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. The Declaration, made by the 
governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, had two main 
purposes. First, to avoid an arms race and a serious imbalance of power 
which might give either the Arabs or Israeli a decided advantage over the 
other. Each of the Middle East countries would be supplied with arms 
only to the minimum level necessary for internal security and legitimate 
self defense. Secondly, the three Western powers would take actions, ·, 
both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent violations of 
armistice lines or frontiers. 13 Mr. Dulles reaffirmed the United States 
commitment and indicated why it was essential to win Arab friendship: 
The Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It 
must be made clear that the present United States Administra-
tion stands fully behind that declaration. We cannot afford 
to be distrusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of ;i/,/ 
freedom. They must not further swell the ranks of Communist 
dictators.14 
It seems evident from statements made by Mr. Dulles and from the 
actions taken by him that he had great respect for the force generated 
by nationalism. Nasser came to control this force. The decisiveness he 
showed in evicting the British from the Suez Bases 1 his active support 
of the Algerian revolt against France, and his dynamic leadership against 
the Israeli was popular with the vast majority of Arabs and made him the 
central figure in the Middle East .• 
Besides following a policy of impartiality by which he hoped to win 
Arab friendship, Mr. Dulles was quite careful not to offend President 
l3Hurewitz, II, pp. 308-309. 
14Department £!. State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 15, 1953), p. 834. 
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Nasser or to openly oppose him. The Baghdad Pact negotiations demonstrate 
the respect which the Secretary had for the force that Nasser represented 
and the need that Dulles felt to cultivate friendly relations with him.15 
In 1951, prior to Dulles' Secretaryship, the Governments of Turkey, 
Great Britain, France and the United States invited Egypt "to participate 
as a founder member of the Middle East Command on the basis of equality 
and partnership with other founder members. 1116 This attempt to organize 
a pact failed when Egypt refused to support it. In 1953, Mr. Dulles 
subtly made a second attempt which was partially successful. He observed 
that "the northern tier of nations1117 showed awareness of the danger of 
the Communist Bloc. 
By 1955 the northern tier had begun to form. The announcement by 
Turkey and Iraq of plans to conclude a military alliance in cooperation 
with the West precipitated a near crisis. The Egyptian Government was 
convinced that such a pact involving an Arab state would destroy Arab 
unity. More important, perhaps, Nasser could see his role as leader of 
the Arab World, in matters of defense at least, being challenged or even 
ursurped by Iraq. Mr. Dulles, not wanting to be associated in a contro-
versy which would offend Nasser, side-stepped overt affiliation with the 
Pact. He explained the u. s. position as furnishing the idea but having 
no particular views on its further development: 
The United States has been ••• sympathetic toward the for-
mation of the Baghdad Pact; indeed, it comes out of an idea I 
developed when I was in that part of the world •••• Then I talked 
15Ne~ York Times, April 21, 1956, p. l. 
16D~;eartment of State Bulletin, xxv, (October 22, 1951), pp. 647-648. 
17ne;eartment of State Bulletin, XXVIII, (June 15, 1953), p. 835. -
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about the "Northern tier" concept, and that idea took hold and 
it resulted in the present Baghdad Pact •••• on the question of 
its further development, the United States has no particular 
views. We have not urged any country to join the Pact.18 
This was a concession by Dulles to Nasser which demonstrates that the 
Secretary recognized the Egyptian President as being a powerful figure 
in the Middle East. As badly as Dulles wanted an anti-Communist alli-
ance to be formed in the Middle East, he paid Nasser the tribute of not 
openly joining the United States to the Pact. 
Regardless of this, perhaps small, gesture on the part of the Secre-
tary of State, Nasser continued to form associations which caused Dulles 
concern. In April 1956 he attended the Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung. 
l---,--. 
Here he was welcomed by such giants as Chou En-lai, Nehru, and Sukarno. 
Dulles regarded Chou as an implacable enemy of freedom. His regard for 
neutralists, such as the latter two, was one of necessary acceptance; 
however, he felt neutralists could exist only because of the protection 
afforded to them by the Western Allies. · They· enj 9yed:. freedom as a~.gift 
but accepted no responsibility in protecting it from Communism.( By mid-
1955 Dulles heard rumors of an arms deal being negotiated by Egypt and · 
the USSR with Czechoslovakia acting as agent. He was certain enough of 
his facts by late August to publicly announce that he was "informed1119 
that the USSR had offered arms to Egypt. This offer was confirmed by 
Deputy Premier Salem of Egypt a day or two later. 20 
120. 
Concurrently with the arms negotiations, Nasser was attempting to 
18oepartment of State Bulletin, XXXIV, (January 23, 1956), pp. 119-
19~ Y~rk Times, August 31, 1955, p. l. 
20Ibid., September 2, 1955 9 p. 2. 
42 
obtain monetary support for the construction of the High Dam at Aswan. 
Dulles saw in Nasser's need an opportunity to win him away from his ques-
tionable friends. However, it was not easy to deal with the'Egyptian 
President I who was keenly aware that the favor of his friend·ship was the 
immediate stake in the East-West dispute. He saw clearly that maximum 
benefit could be had by playing one side against the other. 21 There is 
no doubt that he was either using actual Soviet offers of aid for the 
Dam to exact his terms from the West, or that with the tacit consent of 
the USSR he was us~ng non-existant offers as a ruse to obtain the needed 
support. Dulles was wary and hesitated to extend an offer until he could 
fully analyze the situation. 
Among ~he first evidences that the Soviet.Union m:i;ghtopenly·compete 
with the West in the economic development of the Arab countries was an 
announcement made in Cairo by Soviet Ambassador Solod. He said: '"We 
will send economic missions, scientific missions ••• and any other kind of 
missions you can imagine that will help these countries. 1122 When asked 
to specifically relate this to the Aswan Dam, Mr. Soled replied: "Equip-
ment and unlimited technical aid but no money. 1123 The Egyptian Ambassa-
dor to Washington, Mr~ Ahmed Hussein, announced in October of 1955 that 
the USSR had offered $200 1 000,000 towards construction costs of the.Dam. 
The amount was repayable in cotton and rice over a period of 30 years at 
2lon March 31, 1966 the author interviewed Harold B. Minor, former 
u. s. Ambassador to Lebanon. Ambassador Minor stated that when the USSR 
"entered" the Middle East the condition was created whereby the Arabs 
were courted by two suitors. Nasser played one against the other with 
great skill. 
22~~w. York Times; October 11, 1955, p. 1. 
23 Ibid. 
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2 percent interest. 24 Dulles must have reasoned that the Soviet offer 
either did not exist or that Nasser greatly preferred to deal with the 
West. Why else would he continue to seek Western money? 
On December 19, 1955, about one month after Egypt had stated its 
intentions to accept Soviet arms, Dulles made the decision to proceed 
with the attempt to counter the growing Soviet influence over Nasser. 
The United States and Great Britain announced an offer to help Nasser 
fulfill his dream -- the construction of the Aswan Dam. They proposed 
grants of $56,000,000 and $14,000,000 respectively, which would be surety 
for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which 
would then loan $200,000,000 for the first stage of construction. Mr. 
Dulles announced: 
The United States and the British Governments assured the 
Egyptian Government ••• of their support for this /Aswan Da~ 
project. Such assistance will take the form of grants toward 
defraying foreign exchange costs of the first stages of the ..,,,/ 
work. 
Further assurance has been given ••• that the Governments 
of the United States and the United Kingdom would, subject to 
legislative authority, be prepared to consider sympathetically 
in the light of the then existing circumstances further sup-
port toward financing the later stages to supplement World 
Bank financing. 25 
Here was a helping hand extended to encourage Nasser to be friendly 
towards the West. However, it also contained a warning that his conduct 
was being watched and that further help would be considered, "in the 
light of the then existing circumstances."26 
The West offered conditional phase by phase help. The IBRD insisted 
24Keesing's Contemporary Archives, X, (1955-1956), p. 14486. 
25n~partment E£. State Bulletin, XXXIII, (December 26, 1955), p. 1050. 
26Ibid. 
that Nasser must refrain from any rash actions which might upset the 
Egyptian economy and jeopardize the Bank's investment. Nasser decried 
this as an intolerable infringement upon the sovereignty of Egypt.27 
He wanted a firm. long range commitment which Dulles was unwilling to 
give. To do so would free Nasser to follow an independent policy --
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For the next few months intermittent negotiations took ··lac~. The ~;·/;-· 
United States insisted that all construction bids should be competitive, 
while Nasser insisted that the original contracts should be arbitrarily 
awarded by the Egyptian Government so that time could be saved. However, 
it appeared that Nasser was in no hurry to come to an agreement with the 
Sudan and the other riparian states as to how the water resources of the 
Nile were to be shared. This indicated to Dulles that the urgency which 
Nasser attached to getting started was but another form of pressure. As 
·1ate as April.4, 1956 Dulles noted: "In so far as I am aware there is 
no program for making a prompt start and indeed some of the preconditions 
to a start are still under discussion. 11 28 Prior to this, in March, the 
State Department disclosed that Nasser had not as yet accepted the West= 
ern offer, 29 and Nasser was quoted as saying: "We have not yet rejected 
the Soviet offer."30 
27There is no doubt that Nasser was very sensitive about his sover-
eign rights. When he addressed the Bandung Conference, probably the big 
moment in his life up to .that time, the only real point he made was that 
the internal affairs of states must not be interfered with by other 
states. 
28NE3w York Times, April 4, 1956, p.a. 
29Ibid., March 17, +~56, p. 3. 
30Ibid., April 2, 1956, p. 1. 
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By early July. after some six months of fencing, Nasser decided to 
force the issue with Washington. Ambassador Hussein returned to the 
United States from a meeting in Cairo and indicated to the press that he 
intended to get a definite commitment. He would, according to the~ 
Ypp.~. Times, make the matter "a test of the good faith of the United 
States Government. 1131 
Dulles, on his part, was fairly sure the USSR was not willing to 
assist the Egyptians in financing the Dam which would cost an estimated 
$1 1 300,ooo,ooo.32 At a press conference on December 20 9 1955 he express-
ed his evaluation of the USSR offer: 
The Soviet Union is not like the United States, a country 
which has surpluses. The Sovie.t Union is a deficit area •••• 
It would seem unnatural for the Soviet leaders to provide 
economic aid to other peoples when the peoples they already 
rule are themselves in dire need.33 · 
Dulles felt that Nasser was bluffing and that the USSR was support-
ing the bluffs 
We are not going to put ourselves. in a position where 
the Soviets, by just making paper offers can require us to 
make real offers to top them., •• That would mean that the 
Soviets would be spending nothing except a piece of ~aper 
but would require us to spend a great deal of money. 4 
Dulles called this apparent bluff. When Ambassador Hussein appear-
ed before him on the morning of July 18, 1956, Dulles discussed the 
matter with him briefly and then handed him the official refusal note. 
Herman Finer describes the event as being rather ~motional; 
31Ibid., July 18, 1956, p. 7. 






Dulles appeared to be bringing the various reasons 
against the loan to a head, all in tones rather sad and firm. 
The Ambassador became excited •••• He leaned forward over the 
table, gesticulating. "Don't please say", he blurted out, 
"you are going to withdraw the offer because ••• " (and he 
pointed to his pocket) "we have the Russian offer to finance 
the Dam right here in my pocket!" ••• He /Dulles/ at once re-
torted, "Well, as you have the money already ,:-you don 9 t ne'ed 
any from us? My offer is withdrawn!"35 
The bridge was crossed. Dulles had grossly miscalculated. Nasser 
used the refusal as a pretext to nationalize the Suez Canal Company and 
later accepted a Soviet offer to finance the Aswan High Dam. 
Herman Finer says there is no senstble explanation as to why Dulles 
withdrew his offer. He termed it an "enigma of Dulles' character."36 
··"' 
The State Department issued a release which largely glossed over the 
matter. It said that Egypt was assuming more obligations than her econ-
omy could support at the moment. However the United States would look 
forward to helping her at some future time.37 ·. There is, however, an ex"." 
planation which was consistent with the goals and objectives of the 
United States as defined by President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles. 
The?le is reason to believe that the Secretary decided to take a cal-
cul.ated gamble. If .. he won, and it appears that he believed he would, the 
rewards could have been substantial -- even decisive-... in securing the 
Middle East to the West. 
Mr. Dulles did not believe that the USSR had the economic strength, 
nor the will to risk a large amount of money on a single foreign project. 
Yet the Egyptians had told the world that the Soviet Union had offered 
35riner, pp. 47-48. 
36Ibid., P• 48. 




to finance the costly Aswan Dam, and the USSR had not denied the Egyptian 
report. By withdrawing the Western offer of aid, Dulles probably believed 
that he would be forcing the USSR to publicly admit that it was incapable 
of backing Nasser to such an extent. Such an admission would expose the 
weaknesses of the Soviet economy and make Russian friendship questionable 
in Arab eyes. Nasser would have no choice but to turn from Moscow to 
the West, which could give him the economic support, on Western terms, 
that he needed. Dulles would then have achieved a major policy victory. 
John R. Beal, speaking of the withdrawing of the Aswan Dam offer, 
said: "Dulles' bet was placed on the belief that it would expose the 
shallow character of Russia's foreign economic pretension."38 Beal then 
pointed out the scope of the gamble: 
As a calculated risk his /Duiles/decision was on a grand 
scale •••• It risked opening a key Middle East country whose 
territory bracketed the strategic Suez Canal, to Communist ,/ 
economic and political penetration. It risked alienating other 
Arab nations, controlling an oil supply without which Western 
Europe's mechanized industry and military defenses would be 
defenseless. 39 
It is doubtful that in refusing the loan Dulles was attempting to 
damage Nasser seriously. In the past the Secr~tary of State had been 
very careful not to offend him or berate him publicly. When Nasser pro-
tested against the Baghdad Pact, Dulles yielded the leadership role to 
the British and held aloof from open membership in the Pact. When 
Nasser upset the Western arms control plan by imp9rting Soviet arms, 
Dulles offered no ha~sh condemnation but, instead, said: 
?aJqon R. Beal, quoted in Freda Utley, Will The Middle East Go 




I am not disposed to think that there is any irrevocable 
decision on the part of the Government of Egypt to repudiate 
its ties with the West or accept anything like vassalage to 
the Soviet Union.40 l . 
When Nasser recognized Red China Dulles refused public comment beyond 
the statement: "It is regrettable. 1141 
There seems to be sufficient reason to believe that Dulles was con-
vinced that, given conditions as they were in the Middle East, it would 
be largely influenced by Nasser, its popular leader. The gamble he took, 
if won, could have excluded Communism from the Middle East -- an objective 
of great importance to the United States and the West. The actions Mr. 
Dulles took af.;er the Canal Company was nationalized show further the 
regard that he had for the power which Nasser represented, and offer ad-
ditional evidence that in withdrawing the Aswan loan offer the Secretary 
was striking primarily at.the USSR. 
The withdrawal of Western support from the Aswan Dam project had 
serious repercussions. Not only was the Canal Company seized, but any 
gains that may have been made from following a policy of impartiality 
were forfeited. Nasser felt personal insult, rage, and humiliation. 
The depth of his feeling was revealed in his Nationalization Speech, 
July 26, 1956: 
They do not want us to become an industrial country so 
that they ·can promote the sale of their products and market 
them in Egypt. I never saw any American aid directed to= 
wards industrialization as this would cause us to compete 
with them. American aid is everywhere directed towards 
exploitation • 
. 40Made in answer to a question conce~riing the implications of 
Egypt 9 s arms deal. New ~ Times, April :4, 1956, p. 8. 
41 . · . • Ibid., May 23, 1956, p. 2. 
Whenever I hear talk from Washington I shall say "Die 
of your fury."42 
Nasser's retaliatory act, nationalization of the Canal, no doubt 
caused humiliation to Dulles and angered him for a time. In a televi-
sion address the SecretarY. called the seizure "a national act of venge-
fulness."43 He pointed out, using phrases from Nasser's nationaliza-
tion speech, that the real reason for the seizure was that "Egypt was 
49 
determined 'to score one triumph after another' in order to enhance what 
. he called the 'gr~ndeur' of Egypt. n44 However, along with these uncompli-
mentary remarks, Dulles also praised Nasser and pointed out that they had 
at least one important goal in common -- a free Egypt: 
Now, of course, the government of a free and independ-
ent country -- which Egypt is, and we want to have it al-
ways that -- should seek to promote all proper means the 
welfare of its people. And President Nasser has done much 
good in that respect.45 
The act of nationalizing the Canal and Nasser's vituperous remarks 
could have been justification to join with the British and French to 
force the Egyptain PI'esident to "disgorge what he was attempting to 
swallow. 1146 However, to do so would have jeopardized peace and created a 
situation where Nasser might have been compelled to invite the Red Army 
into the Middle East. 
During the period from nationalization to hostilities Dulles made 
42!.b!, Suez. Canal PI'oblem, p. 29. 
43D~partment of State Bulletin, XXXV, (August 13, 1956), p. 261. 
44Ibid. 
45Ibid. 
46Finer, p. 97. 
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attempts to return the Canal to international management. His task was 
very difficult because of his commitment to a higher goal of peace. He 
was dealing on the one side with a temperamental, unpredictable leader 
of an aroused Arab nationalism and, on the other, with determined allies 
who thought their vital interests were threatened. Both felt their de-
mands were the minimum acceptable terms for settlement, and therefore 
not subject to compromise. 
Great Britain and France were shocked by the nationalization of the 
Canal Company. To them Nasser was an upstart dictator who was emotion-
ally unstable and predictably anti-Western. By seizing the Canal, they 
felt he had seized Western Europe's throat. Even though he pledged to 
operate the Suez Canal in accordan~e with the Constantinople Convention,47 
they believed that as long as Nasser dominated the area, he would not 
rest until he controlled the oil of the Middle East itself. Britain de= 
pended upon oil for her very existance and France was but little less 
vulnerable. Both were convinced that Nasser was the real source of their 
frustrations. The presumptuous seizure of the Canal Company, with what 
they represented to be a complete disregard for a solemn long standing 
international agreement, was not the first but the final and unendurable 
connivance in a series of biting anti-Anglo-French harassments. 
While the British and French reacted with verbal violence 11 it was 
47 In a letter to the Chairman of the Suez Committee Nasser wrote, 
"In nationalizing the company the Government of Egypt unequivocally 
stated that it considers itself bound by the 1888 Convention guaran-
teeing freedom of passage through the Suez Canal ••• ", D. c. Watts, ed., 
Documents on the Suez Crisis, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
(London, 1957),p :-s"6. 
48 New York Times, Aprils. 1956, p. 05 • ........ ,~; 
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not generally agreed that Nasser had acted illegally. There was no clear 
cut evidence that the act of nationalization violated the Constantinople 
Convention of 1888. The Suez Canal Company had never been explicitly 
entrusted with the maintenance of freedom of passage through the Canal, 
and in keeping with international norms, compensation was promised. 
AI'ticle I of the "Egyptian Law Nationalizing The Suez Canal Company, 
July 26j 1956 9 assuI'ed the stockholdeI's of compensation: 
The shareholders and holders of founders' shares will 
be compensated for stock and shares which they own on the 
basis of their closing price on the Paris Bourse immediately .__.,... 
preceding the date on which this law entered into force. 49 
Whether legal or not the French and British recoiled at the thought 
of the Suez Canal coming under the unfettered control of one unfriendly 
man. Prime Minister Eden expressed the British and French view: 
Some people say: "Colonel Nasser promised not to inter-
fere with shipping passing through the Canal. Why, therefo~e, 
don't we trust him?" The answer is simple, Look at the record. 
Our quarrel is not with EgJgt• still less with the Arab World; 
it is with Colonel Nasser. 
The Prime Ministers of Britain and France, Eden and Mollet, left no doubt 
that this man Nasser must rectify his alleged wrong or face serious con-
sequences. 
On the epic day of the seizure, July 26, Secretary Dulles was on a 
ceremonial visit to Lima, Peru to attend the inauguration of President 
49Ibid. It is not within the scope of this study to explore the 
legal aspects of the act of nationalization. Most writers conclude that 
nationalization was well within the norms of past practices and there-
fore legal, however, serious debate centers around Nasser•s ·right, as 
restricted by the Convention of 1888 9 to refuse passage to Israeli ships 
and cargoes . For further treatment of the legal aspects see R.R . Baxter, 
~ ~ 2!,. International Waterways, (Cambridge, 1964). 
SOJames Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suez, (London. 1964), p. 41. - --
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Prado, Mr. Eden telephoned President Eisenhower and suggested a meeting 
in London~ He followed this call with a telegram on the 27th, the day 
after nationalization. The threat to peace which it contained must have 
caused serious concern to Mr. Eisenhower: 
My colleagues and I are convinced that we must be ready, 
in the last resort to use force to bring Nasser to his senses. 
For our part we are prepared to do so. I have this morning 
instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military plan· 
accordingly. 51 
The President dispatched Robert Murphy, an experienced and capable 
career diplomat, to London. His instructions were: "Just go over and 
hold the fort." 52 There was little else to do until more was known of 
the matter and until the Secretary of State could arrive. 
One feature of the London Conferences, which resulted from the 
nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, was the slow pace deliberate-
ly set by Mr. Dulles. Mr. Murphy observed: 
The Secretary of State ••• was disinclined to proceed ~··· 
immediately to London •••• Dulles was content for me to carry 
on talks with Lloyd and Pineau ••• however they were not happy 
about this as they felt that the United States was not tak-
ing the Suez affair sufficiently in earnest.53 
Dulles arrived in London one week after the Canal was nationalized. 
His unhurried trip across the Atlantic apparently did not reflect apathy, 
but was the beginning of a plan worked out with the President to delay 
~ooeedings ;._.'.~ ·President •Eisenhower announced· at a news c't>nf erence, held 
--·~.- ... ·- '-, ..... 
on August 81 1956, that the United States would not hurry negotiations: 
51 Ibid., p. 28 
52 Murphy, p. 379. 
53Ipid,, p. 381 • . ... 
53 
"Here was a matter that seemed to demand a not too hurried solution. 11 54 
No doubt both the President and the Secretary of State felt that emotions 
would spend themselves over a period of time and that, until calmness re-
turned, a peaceful solution, with justice, would be impossible. 
The British and French felt that immediate action would be to their 
advantage. Anthony Eden stated: 
I did not wish to lose momentum, or allow discussions 
to drag from conference to conference •••• Britain and France 
would have preferred to meet as soon as possible; Dulles 
favored several weeks of preparation. In the end we compro-
mised.SS 
A second featureof the London Conferences was Dulles' efforts to 
force a resolution through the pressure of world opinion. In his initial 
conversations with the British and French Dulles emphasized the import-
ance of the need to 11mt>bilize world opinion. 11 56 He stated that the 
countries of the West could marshal world opinion in support of a firm 
but just position, and an international conference of canal users would 
have a profound influence in forming this opinion. Once the world show-
edits-indignation Nasser would have to give just consideration to its 
concern over the Suez Canal. The Secretary expressed this idea during 
a press conference held jointly with the President: 
Mr. President, you and I have often talked about our 
Declaration of Independence and the principles set forth 
in that great document. ~nd one of these principles is 
that to which the founders pledged themselves -- that they 
would pay a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. 
I believe, Mr. President, that most people pay decent 
respect for the opinions of mankind when these are soberly, 
54 The Suez Canal Problem, p. 46 • ........... ..........., _______ . 
55Eden, p. 488. 
56Murphy, p. 379. 
carefully, and deliberately formulated. And because I be-
lieve that, I am confident that out of this conference /called 
to meet in London August 16, 1956/ there will come a judgement 
of such moral force that we can be confident that the Suez 
Canal will go on, as it has for the last 100 years, for the 
years in the future to serve in peace the interests of man-
kind. 57 
A third feature of the conferences was Dulles' attempt to appear 
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impartial in deference to Nasser, whom Dulles respected, not as a person 
perhaps, but as a figure of power around which the Middle East was 
oriented. 
When Dulles departed for London Eisenhower's instructions to him 
were simple and direct: "Prevent military intervention. 11 58 This simply 
stated order was recognized as being difficult to carry out. Protracted 
conferences and negotiations offered the best hope. 
Dulles' initial meeting with Eden and Mollet lasted two days during 
which plans for a general conference were formulated. Invitations were 
transmitted by Her Majesty's Government to the eight signatories of the 
Constantinople Convention of 1888, plu's sixteen other principle users of 
the Canal and Nasser. They were to take part in a conference in London 
on the 16th of August 1956 
in order to establish operating arrangements under an 
international system designed to assure continuity of opera-
tions of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of ••• 1888, 
consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests.59 
At the conclusion of the August 1-2 meeting a tripartite statement 
was made. This statement is significant because it gave the first 
57 . 
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indication of what Dulles considered to be just solution to the dis-
pute o Even though this statement was made in the . name of the Gpvernments 
of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the Secretary ac-
cepted it as his owno His public remarks throughout the dispute varied 
little if any from this general theme. 
First, the Canal Company was linked to the Convention of 1888g 
The Universal Suez Canal Company has always had an inter-· 
national character in terms of its.shareholders, directors and 
operating ·personnel and in terms of its responsibility to as-
sure the efficient functioning as an international waterway of 
the Suez Canalo In 1888 all the Great Powers then principally 
concerned with the international character of the Canal and its 
free, open and secure use without discrimination joined in the 
Treaty and Convention of Constantinople. 
This provided for the benefit of the WOl'ld that the inter-
national character of the Canal would be perpetuated for all 
time, irrespective of the Concession of the Universal Suez 
Canal Company. 60. · · 
Secondly, in o~der that nations could enjoy the use of an international 
waterway upon which the economy, commerce, and security of much of the 
world depends,61 the three Governments 
consider that steps should be taken to establish an 
international system designed to assure the continuity or 
the operation of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention 
of October 29 9 1888.62 
Dulles, Eden, and Mollet were in agreement on the desired settle-
ment. Each wanted freedom of passage through the Canal to be guaranteed 
by an international agency, not one man or one country. There was dis-
harmony, however, as to the means by which a settlement might be reached. 





the agreement be made. 
Egypt declined the invitation to attend the 24 Nation Conference. 63 
Nasser saw no reason to attend a meeting which had the purpose of divest-
ing him of that which he had recently seized and considered rightfully 
Egyptian. Nor could he retreat before the emotion of anti-Westernism 
which he had encouraged as a basis of strength. In his Nationalization 
Speech he had shouted that the Canal would be operated by "Egyptians? 
Egyptians? Egyptians? 1164 It would be difficult to reverse himself even 
if he so wanted. 
In declining the invitation, Nasser rejected the premise put forth 
at London that the Canal was anything but Egyptian: 
The Egyptian Government does not agree with the contents 
of the three Western Foreign Ministers statement concerning 
the Suez Canal. The first paragraph ••• said the Suez Canal 
Company had always had an international status. The Egypt-
ian Government regrets to say that this is unfounded. The 
Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian limited company.65 
Nasser justified this position from the Egyptian point of view which, 
even if legal, was not conducive to a settlement. He then indicated 
that the Canal was being operated properly: 
When the Egyptian Government announced its decision to 
nationalize the Suez Canal Company, it stressed once more 
its intention to guarantee the freedom of navigation through 
the Canal and its nationalization did not in any way affect 
the freedom of navigation through the waterway. A clear 
proof of this was the passage of 766 ships through the Canal 
63Greece also declined. The meeting convened as the 22 Nation 
Conference. Four nations would not endorse the Conference's recommend-
ations so the resulting proposals became known as the 18 Nation Pro-
posals. 
64New York Times, July 27, 1956, p. 1 • ........................... ___ . 
65Ibid., p. 47. 
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during the past two weeks, 66 
The conference of the twenty-two nations which met in London, 
August 16-23, 1956 1 had its origin in a telegram from President Eisen-
hower to Prime Minister Eden, In this message the President proposed 
consultation among as many nations as possible who had interest in the 
Canal. Dulles found that Eden disagreed with such broad representation, 
Eden believed the composition of the conference should be limited to 
those nations who felt their interests were threatened by the national-
ization act. He particularly wanted to exclude the USSR. 67 If represen-
tation were limited in this way the conference would be able to quickly 
agree upon a course of action. The Secretary saw that a conference with 
such membership might conclude that Western rights would best be re-
established by military action. It must have appeared to Dulles that 
Eden was proposing a council of war instead of a conference to seek jus-
tice within the framework of peace, The Secretary of State was able to 
prevail and be 1'compromised1168 invitations to Nasser's friend, the Soviet 
Union, and to his comrades in neutrality, India, Ceylon, and Indonesia. 
These representatives would assure lengthy debate and act to balance 
France and Great Britain, who might advocate using force of arms. 
The compromise, however, did not include Israel. Dulles must have 
reasoned that Israel's presence would be an added affront to the Arab 
world and provide Nasser with a reason not to attend, Therefore, Israel 
could not be invited, It was also expedient to exclude Panama. 
66Ibid,, p. 51. 
67Eden, p. 488. 
68Ibid. 
58 
The Panama Canal was not entirely devoid of significance in the 
Suez dispute because it too was a waterway of international importance. 
If the United States were to stress the internationalization of the Suez, 
how could it morally justify its monoply of the Panama Canal? If it 
should insist that a single nation, in this case Egypt, were not to be 
trusted to operate the Suez, how could it justify the United Stat•s oc-
cupying a similar position of trust? This type of argument may not have 
had too much legal validity, but it carried emotional value in Communist 
countries and in countries which remembered colonial rule. 
Both Eisenhower and Dulles anticipated such arguments and sought 
to forestall them. At a White House Press Conference on August 8, the 
President said: 
It is well to remember that we are dealing with a water-
way here that is not only important to all the economies of 
the world, but by treaty was made an internationa.l waterway 
in 1888. 0 •• It is completely different than the Panama Canal, 
for example, which ••• was a national undertaking carried out 
under a bilateral treaty,69 
Mr. Dulles made the same distinction between Panama and Suez: "The 
Panama Canal is a zone where by treaty the United States has all the 
rights ••• to the entire exclusion of the Republic of Panama to exercise 
· 70 any sovereign rights." Perhaps this small dilemma gave Dulles further 
reason to be tolerant of Nasser's act of nationalization. 
The Secretary of State was obviously opposed to the nationalization 
of the Suez Canal Company. Dulles' decision to withdraw Western support 
of the Aswan Dam was used by Nasser as an excuse to seize the Canal. 
69 · New Yc,rk Times, August 2, 1956, p. 1. 
70Ibid., August 29, 1956, p. 4. 
This in itself must have caused the Secretary to dislike the seizure. 
On August 31 Dulles said that if Nasser's decision to exploit the Suez 
Canal were to go unchallenged "it would encourage the breakdown of the 
international fabric upon which security and well-being of all peoples 
depend. 1171 However, even before the 22 nations convened at London, he 
appears to have been willing to accept nationalization as a regretable 
incident if the moral force of the world failed to bring a settlement. 
In the same August 3 speech he pointed out that: 
After President Nasser's action there were some people 
who counseled immediate forceable action by the governments 
most directly affected. This, however, would have been con-
trary to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and 
would have undoubtedly have led t9 widespread violence en-
dangering the peace of the world. 2 
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The conference of the Twenty-two Nations convened without an Egypt~ 
ian delegation. The USSR, represented by Dmitri Shepilov, supported 
Nasser and accused the West of wanting to perpetuate colonialism and im-
perialism in Egypt. India, represented by Krishna Menon, took a milder 
position, but none-the-less supported Nasser's interests. It is very 
probable that Dulles would have liked to have been able to prepare a 
plan for international operation of the Canal which had behind it the 
full moral force of the entire conference. However, the USSR, India, 
£eylon and Indonesia dissented and, in so doing, probably performed a 
service to Dulles. Their critical attitudes towards the French and 
B~itish acted.as a brake which.Dulles ot~~rw!se would have~? apply if 
force were to be avoided. ,He was also freed from taking a firm stand 
71The Suez Canal Problem, p. 40. ---------
72Ibid. 
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and thereby was enabled to assume a role of impartiality, much as he had 
done earlier in relation to the Arab-Israeli dispute. 
Mr. Dulles dominated the Conference. He waited until the other 
delegates had offered solutions and then put forth the proposals which 
were accepted• after slight editing 1 by 18 of the 22 nations who were 
in attendance. 73 
Some of the comments made by Secretary Dulles at the fifth plenary 
session74 demonstrated his attempt to appear impartial, He said on one 
occasion: "This is not a conference to take decisions binding those who 
do not agree ••• no majority, however large, can bind any minority however 
sma11.-»75 This assured the USSR and lesser dissenters, who were support-
ing Nasser, that they could remain members of the conference without 
jeopardizing their minority views. It also meant that any nation could 
disassociate itself from the recommendations or actions of the group. 
Impartiality was further evidenced by the regard he showed for Nasser. 
He said: 
This is not a conference through which to deliver any kind 
of ultimatum to Egypt •••• Rather we should seek in all honesty 
to express our opinion as to what are the measures which in our 
opinion will establish confidence for the future, while at the 
same time giving full recognition to the sovereign rights of 
Egypt.76 
73spain approved with a reservation that if no agreement could be 
reached with Egypt on the basis of the United States Proposal, as amend-
ed, negotiations should continue on the basis of the proposed Spanish 
Amendment. The~ Canal Problem, pp. 292-293. 
74There were eight plenary sessions plus post conference meetings. 
The conference ran from 16 to 24 August. 
75The Suez Canal Problem, p. 178. ---------
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Mr. Dulles also attempted to show the British and the French that he was 
not insensitive to their position, and that he recognized the importance 
of Suez to them: 
What we are here to do is, as it seems to me, to arrive 
at the greatest possible concensus as to what will best en-
able the Suez Canal to serve dependably its intended purpose 
of promoting the free and secure exchange of products between 
the countries of the world and above all to be a secure link 
between Asia and Europe. This link must not be severed.77 
One other notable feature of the role Mr. Dulles played was the 
determined effort he made to unite the moral force of the world behind 
his proposals. He prefaced these proposals with the statement: 
I may say that this paper does not just represent the 
views of my GoverI¥11ent, it represents views which take in-
to account ••• expressions of opinion which have been given 
around this table in the course of our general debate. The 
large majority of those who have spoken here ••• seem to feel 
that safeguards of the kind suggested by thi_s paper are 
those which are needed. 78 
Later when changes to his proposals were suggested he said: 
Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, I am prepared to 
state that the delegation of the United States accepts the 
proposal of the delegations of Ethiopia, Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey •••• Perhaps our combined proposals could now be known 
as a five nations proposal; I hope before we are through it 
can be known as a twenty-two nation proposa1.79 
The 22-Power Conference produced two basic proposals; the Indian 
Proposal and the United States Proposal. Both sought to establish free-
dom of passage to all users. One difference in the plans was the stress 
given to the. rights of Egypt. The first two points in the Indian Pr0-
posal were definite in this regard: 
77 Ibid., P• 178. 
78 Ibid., Po 180. 
79Ibid., P• 191. 
A peaceful and speedy solution, •• must be found and ••• 
negotiations opened without delay on the basis .of.--
l. The recognition of the sovereign rights of Egypt. 
2. The recognition of the Suez Canal as an integral 
part of Egypt and as a waterway of international importance.80 
The 18-Power Proposal stated only: "Such a system Liuaranteeing free 
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use of the Canal7 ••• would be established with due regard to the sovereign -
rights of Egypt. 1181 
A second point of difference was the degree of authority the pro-
posed Canal Board of Directors would have, The Indian plan stressed: 
"A consultative body of user interests formed on the basis of geographi-
cal representation and interests charged with advisory, consultative, 
and liaison functions. 1182 This board might have responsibility but cer-
tainly no power independent of Nasser. The 18-Power Proposal by contrast 
stipulated autonomy for the Suez Canal Board: "Egypt would grant this 
Board all rights and facilities appropriate to its functioning as here 
outlined. 1183 
Prime.Minister Menzies of Australia led a 9elegation to Cairo to 
present the 18-Power Proposal to Nasser. He was accompanied by the For-
eign Ministers of Sweden, Ethiopia, Iran, and Loy Henderson, a career 
diplomat, representing the United States. The Joint Communique of the 
Suez Committee and the Egyptian Government, showed the United States as 
being represented by "the Honorable J. Foster Dulles, Secretary of State 
SOibid., PP• 288-289. 
81Ibid., p. 291. 
82Ibid., p. 289. 
83 Ibid., P• 292. 
-- Alternate the Honorable Loy W. Henderson. 1184 Herman Finer makes a 
strong point of Eden and Macmillan lipleading11 8S with Dulles to head the 
mission. Dulles chose not to and avoided the important opportunity to ,. 
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attempt to settle a dangerous world situation. However, he no doubt con ... 
sidered the risk too great. He probably had little hope that the propos-
als would be acceptable to Egypt or would even be regarded by her as a 
suitable basis for discussion. Even the moral force of 18 of the 22 
nations was insufficient support to chance further offending Nasser. 
Upon returning to the United States, Secretary Dulles further dis-
associated himself from the 22 Nation Conference and the proposals it 
was submitting to the Egyptian President. At a news conference held on 
August 28, while the Menzies Delegation was enroute to Cairo, a reporter 
asked: 
Mr. Secretary ••• would you regard as an acceptable substi-
tute of the London Plan ••• a plan which would leave the Canal 
in physical control of Egypt but would have Egypt offer guar-
antees of freedom of navigation to countries using the Canal, 
either individually or collectively?86 
Dulles answered~ 
Well, the Canal has been physically in control of Egypt 
for some little time •••• The Canal is in Egyptian territory. 
Now, the question of what arrangements about operations would 
be satisfactory is not primarily a question for the United 
States to answer. The United States is not dependent to any 
appreciable degree upon the Suez Canal. Its ships use the 
Canal but the United States economy is not dependent upon the 
Canal. The economy of a number of countries is vitally depend-
ent upon the Canal and it is primarily for them to have an 
opinion as to what arrangements would in fact restore confi-
dence so that their economies could go on being dependent 
84Ibid., p. 323. 
85riner, p. 173. 
86New York Times, August 29, 1956, p. 4 • 
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upon the Canal. 87 
This was probably an attempt at impartiality, but according to Menzies 
it was a serious blow to the hope that his mission might be success-
ful.88 Nasser must have become assured that the power of the United 
States was not behind its allies but, in fact, committed to restraining 
the British and French. Dulles even partially justified a refusal for 
Nasser. He pointed out that Soviet propaganda, through its Arab lan-
guage radio broadcasts, was saying to the Egyptian people: 
Any solution that comes out of the London Conference is 
colonialism, is imperialism, and if you accept it you will 
have subordinated Egypt again to colonial rule which you 
have just thrown off.89 
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This would, Mr. Dulles said: "Make it extremely difficult for Nasser to 
accept even a fair solution.1190 He went on to say that he believed Nas-
ser would accept a fair plan; however, this addition was anti-climactic. 
He had no doubt made it evident that Nasser's quarrel was not with the 
United States and that if Nasser felt pressured into rejecting the Lon-
don Proposals, because of Egyptian public opinion, the United States 
would understand it to be the fault .of the USSR -- not Egypt. 
President Nasser firmly rejected the proposals. He said: 
The system propo~ed is bound to be considered and treated 
by the people of Egypt as hostile, as infringing on their 
rights and their sovereignty •••• 
In all this we keep constantly in mind the vital import-
ance of genuine international cooperation as distinct from 
domination of any country, be it single domination as Egypt 
87 Ibid. 
88Eden, p. 524. 
89New York Times, August 29, 1956, p. 4 • 
......._ ______ _ 
90Ibid. 
just got rid of or collective domination as would inevitably 
be considered the system proposed by the committee, 
Any attempt to impose such a system would be the signal 
for incalculable strife and would plunge the Suez into ••• 
turmoil.91 
This rejection, possibly abetted by Dulles' words to the press, 
temporarily ended the attempt to resolve the matter by the moral force 
of world opinion. Of the results that came from the 22 Nation Confer-
ence, two seem to stand out quite clearly. Dulles prevented the use of 
force against Nasser. He also disassociated himself from the dispute 
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to the extent that if force were used the United States would not direct-
ly share the blame. It is not known whether the latter result was ac-
-
' 1 (, " 
tively sought or whether it was an unplanned outcome of being impartial, 9u- ~ 10 , s 
\,.le v., \ · 
The Secretary now turned to a new plan.92 A Suez Canal Users As-
sociation (SCUA) was to be formed among the user nations. This associ-
ation would somehow transit its ships through the Canal, ignoring Nasser 
except to pay him a fee with which he would maintain the facilities. 
Anthony Eden, who proposed the plan for Dulles, interpreted the 
Secretary's draft to include the following points: 
l. The users should organize for the purpose of establish-
ing for themselves the most effective possible enjoyment of 
right of passage given by the 1888 Convention. 
2. The Association would have its qwn pilots. 
3. The Association would cooperate with Egypt on matters 
of pilotage and scheduling. 
4. If Egypt did not cooperate ships would marshal at 
either end of the Canal and be convoyed through. 
5. Transit dues would be collected by the association. 
91The Suez Canal Problem, p. 319. ---------
92when asked·directly if the plan originated in Washington Dulles 
did not deny it. Ibid., p •. 340. Anthony Eden credits the plan· to Dulles. 
Eden, p. 332. Herman Piner says Dulles thought up the scheme while 
vacationing at his Duck Island retreat. Finer, p. 207. 
Egypt would be compensated for those facilities she furnished. 
6. Oil traffic would be rerouted to decrease dependence 
upon the Canal. 
7. Additional oil would be supplied to Europe from the 
Western Hemisphere.93 
Point four certainly implies the use of force and even occupation 
of key ground installations should Nasser not cooperate. How else, for 
example, would such an elementary task such as raising a draw bridge be 
accomplished? Items five and six imply that economic pressure would be 
applied. The whole substance of the Eden version of the plan was to 
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force shipping through the Canal and apply economic pressure until Nasser 
submitted. If neither of these features were at least threatened the 
plan was nothing. Certainly it could not be expected that Nasser would 
willingly reverse the stand he had so recently taken. 
On September 13th, about one week prior to the convening of a second 
London Conference, Dulles held a news conference in which he explained 
his views on SCUA. He wanted to begin de facto transit through the 
Canal and divorce this from a political settlement~ 
I said that the great difficulty with this situation was 
not that the problems themselves were unsolvable, but that 
they became unsolvable in the context of great concepts such 
as "sovereignty and dignity" and "grandeur", and the "East 
versus the West" and things of that sort •••• And this is our 
hope-= if we get operating problems out of the hands of the 
diplomats, the statesmen, and get it down perhaps into a 
situation where practical ship operators are dealing with 
practical people on the part of Egypt, perhaps some of these 
problems can be solved.94 
Mr. Dulles envisioned that the administrative agency of the Users 
Association might deal directly with the Egyptian Canal operators and 
93Eden, pp. 533-535. 
94The Suez Canal Problem, p. 337. 
for some unexplained reason Nasser would permit this: 
Well, I would expect that there would be contact, as I 
say, not with the head of Egyptian Government, because the 
purpose here is to get the operating problems out of the 
domain of the politicians, the heads of government, and the 
diplomats and try to get it down to rock bottom. The 
Egyptian Government has people there who are operating 
people, concerned with the operation of this Caria.1. And I 
suppose there would be somebody representing this associ-
ation who himself is a qualified person in maritime matters 
who knows about the Canal and the sending of ships through 
its and there would be a practical talk there and the 
users' agent might say, "Now, here we have got a vessel, 
Mr. X; you haven't got any good pilot to put aboard this 
vessel. We have got a pilot who is well qualified. He 
has been working for the Suez Canal Company here for the 
last 15 years. We would be glad to put him on the boat. 
And we hope that under those circumstances you will ac-
cept him as a qualified pilot to take the boat through 
the Canal." And I would hope that under these circum-
stances the Egyptian operating authority would say, "Sure, 
we don't waive our right; perhaps we claim we may have the 
legal right to hire and fire all the pilots, but let's 
leave aside the question of legal rights, reserving them. 
You go ahead and go through the Canal." We hope that is 
what would happen.95 
This sounds rather infantile in itself but he then further deprec-
iated SCUA. Dulles made it clear that the United States would not use 
force: 
We do not intend to shoot our way through. It may be 
that we have the right to it, but we don't intend to do it 
as far as the United States is concerned. If we are met 
with forces, which we can only overcome by shooting, we 
don't intend to go into that shooting. Then we intend to 
send our boats around the Cape.96 
This assured Nasser again that the United States would act quite moder= 
ately. 
Dulles stressed that SCUA was an association. No nation was bound 
-------
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by a majority, nor was any nation being led by another. He was again be-
ing impartial and at the same time disassociating the United States from 
any abrupt action that any nation might take. 
As mentioned above Dulles' plan implied economic sanctions. SCUA 
was to collect its own tolls and pay Nasser for actual services render-
ed. At the time of nationalization about 55 percent of Canal dues were 
collected in London, 10 percent in Paris and 35 percent in Egypt.97 
United States ships paid dues in Egypt. The Secretary had an opportun-
ity to deprive Nasser of this revenue; however, it was never done in 
spite of Eden's urgings. 98 Dulles did make overtures in this regard, 
but hostilities broke out before they were put into practice. In a let-
ter to Foreign Minister Lloyd he promised that in regard to SCUA 
steps will be taken with our Treasury officials and with /, 
representatives of owners of American flag vessels ••• with a 
view to perfecting this cooperation in terms of actual oper-
ating practices.99 
However, American shipping firms register most of their ships in foreign 
countries. To exclude American ships flying foreign flags made this 
promise a rather meaningless gesture, In fact, Dulles admitted that the 
economic sanction portion of SCUA was non-existant. At a press confer-
ence held on September 26, 1956, the question was put~ 
But isn't it a matter of fact, Mr. Secretary, that since 
you are limiting this dues freeze or diversion only to United 
States flag ships ••• that it would alter very little the amount 
of money now being paid ••• to the Egyptian Government?lOO 
97Eden, p. 489. 
98 Ibid., p. 508. 
99~ ~ Canal Problem, p. 369. 
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Dulles answered: 
That is a fact •••• There will still be plenty of boats to 
go through the Canal because there are a lot of ships of some 
other registry; ships will be transferred maybe to a registry 
which makes it easier to go through the Canal ••• there will 
always be a certain amount of revenue to Egypt from that L---
source. Perhaps it won't be quite as much but ••• the burden 
on Egypt will not be quite as much either.101 
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A reporter then asked a questio_n that Mr. Dulles probably would have 
preferred not to have been asked. It illustrates again the uncomfortable 
ground that the Secretary was on in trying to be impartial and yet find a 
peaceful solution to the problem. The reader should bear in mind that 
force was not to be used in transiting the Canal: 
Q. Mr. Secretary, what view does the United States take 
of Israel participation in the Suez Canal Users' Association? 
A. Well, that matter has not come up. The provisional 
view which was taken at the Second London Conference was that 
the qualifications for membership would probably be similar to 
those which prevailed at the time of the First London Confer-
ence; namely, one million net tons or more of shipping through 
the Canal during the prior calendar year, or a pattern of trade 
which showed approximately 50 percent or more dependence upon 
the Canal. If those are adopted, ••• then Israel would not be 
eligible to be a member. 
On the other hand, you may recall that the proposal --
that the statement that was issued about the Users' Associa= 
tion did say that the facilities of the Association would be 
made available to any vessels whether or not members. Be= 
cause we believe that the principle of non-discriminatory 
passage through the Canal, in accordance with the 1888 Treaty, 
is one we should recognize ourselves, and that we should not 
try to set up an organization which obtained preferential 
rights for our members. So if any other vessel wants to get 
the facilities of the Association, ••• those facilities will 
be available to it. 
Q. Mr. Secretary, then Israel, on the basis which you 
have just now discussed, would actually be deprived, as a 
consequence of the blockade that Egypt has ~racticed. 
A. Well, as I pointed out, whether or not Israel is an 
lOlibid. 
actual member of the Association is irrelevant from the stand-
point of the facilities of the Association being made avail-
able, let us say, to Israeli ships, and to Israeli cargoes • ._,.-----
They would have all the facilities of the Association.102 
Regardless of this attempt to imply that Israel's interests were 
not being neglected it must have been obvious to the Israeli that they 
were still to be excluded from using the Canal even if SCUA did become 
operational. 
The Egyptian President denounced SCUA in an emotion packed speech 
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delivered on September lS~ He left no doubt that Egypt would have noth-
ing to do with the so-called Suez Canal Users' Association: 
Today they are speaking of a new association whose main 
objective would be to rob Egypt of the Canal and deprive her 
of her rightful Canal dues •••• we shall defend our freedom 
and independence to the last drop of our blood.103 
L.----
In light of Nasser's before-the-fact rejection of SCUA it must have 
been realized by the delegates that the Second London Conference was 
going to be a waste of time. Dulles felt called upon to instill a great-
er sense of purpose in the not too optimistic conferees. On the 19th of 
September he made two rather lengthy speeches. The second, an extempor= 
aneous one, was to a large extent a pep talk in which he introduced the 
idea that the conference would be useful in preparing the problem for 
resolution by the United Nations: 
Now the question has been raised, is there any use going 
ahead with this user's organization proposal because President 
Nasser has said in advance -- we read in the papers -- that he 
will not accept it. I think the answer to that question is 
· partially covered by what I have already said, namely, that 
even if it is going to be rejected by the Government of Egypt, 
l02Ibid., p. 97. 
1o3T~~ ~ Can~i Problem, p. 349. 
we are getting the problem in shape so that it could be 
handled by the United Nations.104 
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He prepared this proposition quite carefully and suggested that this con-
ference was necessary because the proposal 
last time, /the proposal developed at the 22-Power Con-
ferenc:J' ••• was nC:t the kind of proposal which fitted in with 
the procedure and power of the United Nations, either the 
Security Council or much less the Assembly, ••• the proposals 
we suggest here for a practical provisional solution are c--
just the kind that the United Nations, in my opinion, can 
do something about •••• We are not looking to the United Na-
tions as a means of pushing this problem under the rug •••• 
If that is all we are interested in ••• of course we do not 
need any preparatory work.105 
It must have been obvious to all that so far as original intent was con-
cerned, the conference was preordained failure. However, to admit such 
to the world was another matter. Dulles must have realized, however, 
that his tenure as the personal, impartial peace maker was about to end. 
What was SCUA? According to Dulles it was an association of Canal 
users, none of whom was bound by the decisions of the others. Its pur-
pose was to 
assist members in the exercise of their rights as users 
of the Suez Canal in consonance with the 1888 Conventiono,o 
to promote saia~ orderly, efficient, and economical transit 
of the Canal. 
In carrying out its purposes military and economic force would not be 
used. In actuality it did not attempt to change conditions. If Nasser 
wanted to let ships transit the Canal, fine. If not, they could go 
around the Cape. 
l04Ibid., p. 359. 
lOSibid., pp. 357-358. 
l06Ibid, 1 p. 631. 
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The practical results of the Second London Conference, which creat-
ed SCUA 9 were about the same as the earlier 22 Nation Conference. The 
dispute between Nasser and the Anglo-French was not resolved. However, 
the Secretary achieved that which was achievable within the context of 
the United States goal of peace. Force had not been used against Nasser. 
Time. the eternal healer, had been gained. Dulles maintained a relative-
ly neutral posture and, if force were used, the United States could not 
be directly blamed. 
France and Great Britain, who felt vitally threatened by the seizure 
of the Canal. did not leave the matter entirely to Dulles. From the out-
set they began preparing to use force, if necessary, to assure that their 
economic life was not left "in the unfettered contro111107 of Nasser. 
Eden stated his intentions in his first dispatch to Eisenhower: 
My collegues and I are convinced that we must be ready, 
in the last resort, to use force to bring Nasser to his 
senses. For our part we are prepared to so do. I have this 
morning instructed our Chiefs of Staff to prepare a military 
plan accordingly.108 
These plans went forward steadily. There were continuous meetings be-
tween France and Britain to effect the coordination necessary for such 
an undertaking. Cyprus; which was selected as the staging area, was 
garrisoned and stocked with material, armour and aircraft. It is dif-
ficult to determine how much of this activity was known to the State De-
partment or the President. However, it was in these plans that Eden and 
Mollet put their ultimate faith. The Anglo-French Foreign Offices met 
in conferences with Dulles while their War Offices prepared for the 
l07Eden, p. 483. 
l08Eayrs, p. 28. 
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contingency that diplomacy and meetings would not provide an acceptable 
solution. In this sense the two London Conferences were useful to the 
French and the British. They kept the mind of the world occupied with 
conference matters which, to an extent, shielded their military build-
Eden and Mollet were anxious, nearly from the outset, to submit the 
Suez matter to the United Nations. They realized that to undertake mili-
tary action without first complying with their obligations under the 
Charter would isolate them as aggressors and subject them to condemna= 
tion by much of the world. It is doubtful that they hoped to redress 
their grievences in the Security Council as the Soviet Union would cer-
tainly defend the interests of Egypt. However, taking the matter to the 
United Nations was prerequisite to resolution by direct action. Prime 
Minister Eden said that: "As signatories to the Charter, we had under= 
taken not to resort to military action without first going to the United 
Nations. 11109 
Dulles and Eisenhower were aware that this obligation must be met 
before Great Britain and France would force a decision by arms. The 
President had earlier indicated that taking the problem to the United 
Nations was not a prudent step. He explained: "Well of course you al= 
ways have the veto in the United Nations."llO President Eisenho\>let' later 
noted in a letter to Winston Churchill that he 
particularly urged him /Eden/ in a letter of July thirty= 
first, to avoid the use of force; at least until it had been 
proved to the world that the United Nations was incapable of 
' , 
109Edent p. 509. 
llOThe Suez Canal Problem, p. 46. ~ ............ ______ _ 
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handling the problem 0 lll 
Eden quotes Dulles as saying that the United States could be counted on 
for support in the Security Council on the understanding that the move 
was "an honest attempt to reach a solution and not a device for obtain-
ing covero"112 There seems to be little doubt that the United States 
was making a determined effort to keep the matter from the United Nations. 
On August 30j Ed.en dispatched a draft of a resolution to Wash-
ington which he proposed that Great Britain, France, United States and 
Belgium should collectively put before the Security Council. Belgium 
was included because she was a member of the Cbuncil at the time and not 
in sympathy with Nasser's actionso Dulles refuaed to be a party to the 
1 • i h " h . f" ". " 113 . He' reso ution, say ng tat it gave t e appearance o ganging up •. 
then prevailed upon Eden to be content with merely drawing the matter to 
the attention of the Security Council without requesting formal consid-
eration. Even in this limited matter Mr. Dulles refused to join as a 
signator because he wanted to remain impartial and uncommitted to allies 
whom he must have suspected were becoming impatient. 
Notification was given to the Security Council and new dimension 
of Suez diplomacy began.· United Nations records show: 
On September 12, the I"epresentatives of France and the 
United Kingdom informed the Security Council that the situa-
tion created by the action of Egypt ••• was regarded by them 
as an aggravation of the situation. which if allowed to 
continue, would constitute a manifest danger to peace and 
111nwight Do Eisenh6wer, Waging Peace, (New York, 1965), p. 680. 
112Eden, p. 513. 
113 i . lb d. 1 P• 515. 
security.114 
The USSR also "left a calling card11115 with the Security Council. 
The statement, three days after the Anglo-French note, declared: 
Military preparations of the United Kingdom and France, 
conducted with the support of the United States, ••• were 
grossly at variance with the principles of the Charter and 
could not be regarded otherwise than an act of aggression 
against Egypt. 116 . · 
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Two days later, on the 17th, Nasser also countered the Anglo-French move. 
His "calling card" informed the Council that the Suez Canal Users' Assoc-
iation was aimed "particularly by France and the United Kingdom at tak-
ing virtual possession of the Canal and destroying the very independence 
of Egypt. 11117 
The USSR and Egypt went no further than the Anglo-French. No one 
requested formal action by the Security Council. The Soviets and Egypt, 
like the United States, must have realized the danger in going to the 
United Nations. They must have felt that once the dispute reached the 
Security Council Britain and France would feel that their moral obliga-
tion to the Charter was satisfied and, if Nasser did not back down, they 
would be free to personally insure that their vital interests were pro-
tected. The initiative in taking the dispute to the United Nations was 
with the Anglo-French and the degree of restraint Mr. Dulles could impose 
ll4Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, (New York, 1957), p. 20 • . .... ,...,.......... ---
ll5one of the French leaders, probably Mollet, described Dulles' 
recommendation to inform the Security Council but to request no actioni 
as "leaving a calling card. He saw no harm in it, but no good either." 
Eden, p. 531. 
116Yearbook 2£_ .!b!, United Nations, 1956, p. 20. 
117Ibid. 
76 
upon them had diminished. 
Eden and Mollet, though weary of the delays effected by Dulles, had 
used the time prudently. Their forces were marshaled to the degree that 
a swift and successful strike against Nasser was predictable. Beyond 
this point, however, time was definitely against them. Eden noted that 
a serious change of opinion was taking place. Initially the British 
public was outraged at Nasser's action. Members of both sides of the 
aisle in the House of Commons expressed indignation with Nasser. Mr. 
Hugh Gaitskell, although counseling caution, said: 
While I have not hesitated to express my disagreement with 
the Government in their policy in the past I must make it abund-
antly clear that anything they have done or not done in no way 
excuses Colonel Nasser's action in seizing the Canal •••• The fact 
is that this episode must be recognized as part of the struggle 
for the Middle East. That is something which I do not feel we 
can ignore •••• It is all very familiar. It is exactly the same 
that we encountered from Mussolini and Hitler.118 
Herbert Morrison, a member high in the councils of the Labor Party, went 
so far as to approve the use of force: 
If our Government and France and, if possible, the United l,,/'/ 
States, should come to the conclusion that in the circumstances 
the use of force would be justified ••• ! think in the circum-
stances of this particular case it might well be the duty of 
hon. members, including myself, to say that we would give them 
support.119 
There was a strong feeling within the Labor Opposition, including 
Gaitskell and Morrison, that the matter should be taken directly to the 
United Nations. However, Morrison, at least, originally shared Eden's 
belief that justice, as Great Britain saw justice, must be "expeditious 
118Eayrs, pp. 33-36. 
ll9Ibid., P• 38. 
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and effective11120 or Britain had the moral right to sanction by force of 
arms. 
The original support given by Labor to the Conservative Government 
dwindled and then changed to vehement opposition. By September B, the 
New York Times noted: "The Labor Party has shifted from its initial -----
attitude of support for Sir Anthony's forceful measures to vociferous 
opposition. 11121 Mr. Eden chided the Laborites for withdrawing support 
of the Government. Mr. Gaitskell 1 s rejoinder, in the House of Commons, 
shows the wide rift that had developed within a short 30 days and some 
of the reasons for itg 
At the beginning of his speech the Prime Minister referred 
to our debate on second August and spoke of the general agree-
I 
'-----
ment which then prevailed ••• but I must point out to the Prime 
Minister that since then wide differences in opinion have emerged 
in the country and there has been, indeed, a very animated and 
serious debate in the press •••• The points at issue are, I think, 
fundamental and quite specific, and they concern the attitude of,,.,,/ 
the Government to use force as a means of resolving this serious 
dispute and they concern the Government's attitude to the United 
Nations Charter.122 · 
The Labor leader then reviewed his party's attempts to have the 
dispute referred to the United Nations: 
We made a proposal on thirteenth August also that the 
Government should refer the whole issue ••• to the United 
Nations, to in fact a special Assembly. But that too was 
ignored •••• we ought to take this matter at once to the 
Security Council ••• the Government ••• should make it plain 
that they will accept any decision of the United Nations 
in this dispute.123 
120Ibid. 
121New York Times, September 8, 1956, p. 1. -----
122Ibid., September 12, 1956, pp. 12-13. 
123Ibid. 
J ' 
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The shift in British public opinion and the change in the attitude 
of the Labor Party must have been satisfying to Dulles. It was exactly 
this type of a development that he had hoped for. However, Labor was 
working against the restraints he had imposed upon Eden by demanding that 
the dispute be referred to the United Nations. Restraints were also 
weakened by other factors. Two London Conferences had failed to redress 
the Anglo-French grievences. The Anglo-French forces were now suffici-
ently strong and in position to strike Nasser. With opinion turning a-
way from the use of force, further delay would definitely be harmful to 
the purposes of Eden and Mollet. 
The Second London Conference ended September 21, 1956. Secretary 
Dulles returned to Washington where he was met at the airport by his 
Under Secretary Herbert Hoover, Jr. According to Herman Finer, Mr. 
Hoover hurriedly told Dulles that the British and French were taking the 
dispute to the United Nations immediately.124 The decision was apparent-
ly made while the London Conference was still in session and Dulles was 
available for consultation. Eden and Mollet were ready to move. 
The actions and debates which took place in the United Nations are 
significant to this study in that they illustrate two pointsg First, 
the debates indicate that Mr. Dulles' concept of justice remained un-
changed and, secondly, his actions prove that he was, above all, deter-
mined to maintain peace in the Middle East. 
The first address the Secretary made to the United Nations was be-
fore the Security Council. This speech gave a clear understanding of 
what he thought a just settlement of the Canal dispute s~ould be. As to 
l 24Finer, p. 261. 
Egypt's rights as a sovereign nation, Mr. Dulles said~ 
Now the Suez Canal, to be sure goes through what is now 
Egypt, and in this sense the Canal is "Egyptian." But the 
Canal is not, and never has been, purely an internal affair 
of Egypt •••• Its character as an international right-of-way 
was guaranteed for all time by the 1888 Convention. Egypt 
cannot rightfully stop any vessel or cargo from going through 
the Canal •••• The operation of the Canal should be insulated 
from the influence of the politics of any nation. 
If such a waterway may be used as the instrument of 
national policy by any government -- any government which 
physically controls it -- then that canal is bound to be an 
international bone of contention. Then no nation depending 
on the canal can feel secure, for all but the controlling 
nation would be living under an economic "sword of Damocles." 
That would be to negate the 1888 Convention and to violate 
both justice and law.125 
Secretary Dulles concluded his speech by stating his support for 
the Anglo-French Proposal which had been submitted to the Council earl-
ier. The proposals were based upon the agreement reached earlier by 18 
of the 22 nations who had participated in the First London Conference. 
Two of the six points in the Anglo-French Proposal should be mentioned~ 
1. there should be free and open transit through the 
Canal without discrimination, overt or covert -- this covers 
both political and technical aspects; 
3. the operation of the Canal should be insulated from 
the politics of any country.126 
Point number one, free and open transit, no doubt included Israel. The 
phrase, "without discrimination",127 would appear to give it universal 
application. In addition, Secretary Dulles had earlier stated~ 
Egypt is in defiance ••• of a decision by the Security 
Council ••• taken in 1951 ••• which was re-affirmed again 9 I 
think, in 1953!il that under the terms of the Treaty of 1888 
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125Departmen~. 2£.. State Bulletin, XXXV, (October 22, 1956), pp. 611-
617 0 
126Ibid., p. 616. 
127 Ibid. 
the Israeli shipping was entitled to go through and that 
Egypt was not entitled to bar it as it was doing.128 
According to the Secretary then, justice still required that a 
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settlement include an international board to govern the operations of L · · 
the Canal and that the Canal be opened to the ships of all nations in-
cluding those of Israeli registery. 
Hostilities broke out on October 29 when Israel invaded Sinai. 
Prior to this, on September 23, France and the United Kingdom had request-
ed that the Security Council convene for the purpose of considering the 
situation brought to the Council's attention by their letter of September 
12. This letter had stated: 
The refusal of Egypt to negotiate on the 18-Power propos= 
als ••• was regarded as an aggravation of the situation which if 
allowed to continue! would constitute a manifest danger to 
peace and security. 29 
The following day, Egypt requested an "urgent meeting to consider actions 
against Egypt by some powers, particularly France and the Unite.a Kingdom, 
which constituted a danger to international peace and security. 11130 Both 
requests were put on the agenda with the Anglo-French item having prior= 
ity. The question was discussed in seven open meetings and three closed 
ones in which Egypt took part. Israel and Arab nations other than Egypt 
sought to participate but "action on their requests was postponed. 11131 
On October 13 the Anglo-French Proposal, which Dulles supported as 
128nepartment 2f_ State Bulletin, XXXV, (September 10, 1956), p. 408. 
129Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, (New York, 1957), p. 20. ----- - -------
130Ibid. 9 p. 21. 
131Ibid. 
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a basis for settlement, was defeated by a Soviet vetoo 132 The negative 
vote was no doubt expected by Eden and Mollet who had geared their plans 
to this contingency •. They felt their obligations to the Charter had been 
met and were now free to seek "justice'' through other means. 
On October 29 Israeli armed forces began a penetration of Egyptian 
territor}'o The United S.tates requested an immediate meeting of the Secur-
ity Council to consider steps for the immediate cessation of the military 
133 action taken by Israel. The meeting convened the next morning. Am-
bassador Lodge indicted Israel and then forcefully. re~uested the Council 
to act against her: 
The Government of the United States feels that it is 
imperative ••• to order that military actions undertaken by 
Israel cease immediately, and to make clear its view that 
the Israeli armed forces be immediately withdrawn behind 
the established armistice lines. Nothing less will suf-
fice.nl34 
The forcefulness of Mr. Lodge's address indicates that he had received' 
unequivocal instructions from Washington. His statement that followed 
could have been directed at the British and French but more probably was l./ 
an appeal to the USSR: "No one nation certainly should take advantage 
of this situation for any selfish interest. 11135 Mr, Lodge's resolution 
was defeated by an Anglo-French veto as was a similar one proposed by 
the USSR. 
132Department 2f_ State Bulletin, xxxv. (October 22, 1956) 1 p. 616. 
133Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, p. 25, ------- -
134Department of State Bulletin, XXXV, (November 12, 1956) 9 p. 748. 
135Ibid. 
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Eden and Mollet disregarded a personal appeal from President Eisen-
hower,136 as had Israel, and began an assault upon Egypt. 
At this point in time, October 31, a Yugoslav draft resolution was 
passed which allowed the dispute to be shifted from the Council to an 
emergency special session of the General Assembly where the veto was not 
applicable.137 
Secretary of State Dulles again took personal charge of the matter. 
He told the Assembly of the injustices, suffered by.all parties, which 
had led to hostilities but he left no doubt but that the United States 
condemned the resort to armed forces as a means of righting injustice; 
"We have come to the conclusion that these provocations, serious as they 
are, cannot justify the resort to armed force. 11138 The Secretary then 
went on to recommend that the Assembly "take action which will assure 
that this fire ••• shall be promptly extinguished.11139 
The General Assembly Resolution on the Middle East, introduced by 
Secretary of State Dulles, was passed 64 to 5 with 6 abstentions. Its 
significant provisions were; a cease fire; all parties to withdraw all 
forces from Egyptian territory; members would refrain from introducing 
military goods into the area; steps would be taken t.o re-open the Canal 
and restore freedom of navigation.140 These provisions were consistant 
with United States goals and objectives. 
136Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 77. 
137 Yearbook .2!_ .!h!, United Nations, 1956, pp. 27-28. 
138Department .2!_ State Bulletin,_ XXXV, (November 12, 1956) 11 p. 750. ,.,., 
139Ibid., p. 7 55. 
140rbid., p. 754. 
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First, and most important, peace had to be restored and hostile 
forces withdrawn from Egypt. If these conditions were met quickly Nasser 
would have no reason to accept Russian volunteers into his country or to 
form an alliance with Moscow. There would be no further need to destroy 
oil installations nor need to further block the Canal. Once conditions 
were returned to pre .. war status, steps could then be taken to re-open 
the transportation link to Europe and the search for a just settlement 
of the crisis continued. As Mr. Dulles stated before the General Assem-
bly, the fire must be promptly extinguished, "then we shall turn with 
renewed vigor to curing the injustices out of which this trouble has 
141 
ariseno 11 
Dulles' resolution, Resolution 997 adopted by the General Assembly 
November 2, 1956, was not fully complied with until mid-March 1957. Al-
though the matter had been ostensibly turned over to the United Nations, 
the United States continued independent efforts to force the Anglo-French 
and Israeli leaders to withdraw their forces. Anthony Eden states that 
Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, telephoned London and made it 
clear that the United States would not extend help to Great Britain until 
she made a public commitment to promptly withdraw her forces. 142 After 
the commitment was made Eden noted; "We now found the United States 
Government more helpful on.two matters, the support of sterling and the 
supply of oilo 11143 Merrill Mueller substantiates Eden's statemento He 
quotes Foreign Secretary Lloyd as saying; "Britain was surprised by the 
141Ibido, P• 7550 
142 . Eden, Po 641. 
143Ibid.t Po 644. 
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intensity of American support for economic sanctions against us, especi= 
ally an oil embargo. We can do without everything but that. 11144 
Israel was particularily reluctant to withdraw her forces. She was, 
among other things, trying to force a guarantee that Israeli ships and 
cargoes would be permitted free passage through the Suez Canal and 
through the straits of Tiran into the Gulf of Aqaba. The use of both of 
these waterways had been denied Israel. By occupying Sharm el Shaikh, 
at the narrow entrance to the Gulf, Israel was again able to use her port 
of Elath located on the Gulf of Aqaba. 
On February 11, 1957, Secretary Dulles handed Israeli Ambassador 
Eban an ~memoire. This note requested that Israel evacuate the Gaza 
Strip and Sharm el Shaikh. In return the Secretary inferred that the 
United States would insure Israel free passage into the Gulf of Aqaba. 
He statedg ''The United States believes ••• that no nation has the right 
to prevent free and innocent passage into the Gulf. 11145 Dulles con-
tinued2 
It is of course clear that the enjoyment of a right 
of free and innocent passage by Israel would depend upon 
its prior withdrawal •••• The United States has no reason 
to assume that any littoral nation would under these 
circumstances obstruct the right of free and innocent 
passage.146 
Then in an apparent attempt to prove that the straits of Tiran "compre= 
hended international waters11147 which Isreal could use the Secretary 
144Merrill Mueller to Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 19, 1956, 
Eisenhower Papers, LL-116, Eisenhower Library. 
145united States Policy .!!!. the Middle East, p. 290. 
146Ibid., p. 291. 
147 Ibid., p. 290. 
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added~ "The United States, on behalf of vessels of United States regis-
try, is prepared to exercise the right of free and innocent passage. 11148 
How this would help Israel was left open to questioning. 
From the time hostilities had begun until the last foreign soldier 
had evacuated Egyptian territory, Mr. Dulles worked under the greatest 
of pressure. His ultimate fear was that the Soviet Union might gain a 
commanding influence in the strategically important Middle East and that 
the oil resources would be lost to the West. These fears were not with-
out foundation. 
There was a real danger that the USSR would be asked to send forces 
into the area. Major General Ali Abu Nuwar, Chief of Staff of Jordanian 
I 
Forces, had warned of such a development in August 1956: '----··--· 
We feel that if Britain and France attacked Egypt it 
would be open aggression and we Arabs would be all united 
against them. We are not strong enough to fight them alone !.__./· 
without an ally and it is obvious who that would be. 
War between Britain and Egypt would inevitably lead 
to an alliance with the Soviet Union.149 
The USSR kept this "inevitably" before Dulles. Threats to send volun-
teers to the Middle East were made150 and Bulganin suggested to Eisen-
ho~er that both the USSR and the USA should dispatch forces to the Mid= 
dle East. 151 
i.' 
Prior to hostilities, on September 15, the Soviet Ambassador to the 
United Nations made some predictive remarks as to the consequences of 
148 • . 
Ibid., p. 291. 
149New York Times, (August 28 1 19-56), p. 2. 
150Ibid., (November 7, 1956), p. 33. 
151Ibid., (November 6, 1956), p. l. 
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war in the Middle East. He said: 
To impose a solution of the Suez Canal issue by force of 
arms r.isked immense destruction in the Suez Canal and in the 
oil fields and pipelines in the countries of the Arab East. 
A foreign invasion of Egypt would arouse the peoples of Asia 
and Africa •••• The USSR could not stand aside from the Suez L----- · 
problem because any violation of peace in the area could 
not but affect its security.152 
It is doubtful that these remarks were in any way new to Mr. Dulles. 
However, in the first hours of the war the reality that the Soviet Am-
bassadorvs remarks warned of began to unfold. 
Nasser 1 s first act was to block the Canal. Demolitions and sunken 
ships paralyzed the waterway.153 The following day, November 1, 1956, 
Radio Cairo broadcast two appeals. One, called on all workers to sabo-
tage oil installations and pipelines and to attack foreign military 
bases. The next day all three Syrian pumping stations of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company's pipeline were blown up. The second appeal origin-
ated from the rector of Al-Azhar University, calling all Moslems to a 
holy war upon the intruders.154 
Thus, interests vitar to the United States were placed in a criti-
cal state of jeopardy by Israel, France, and the United Kingdom. Dulles, 
recognizing that disaster would result if the United States continued a 
policy of impartiality, took those forceful actions which he felt were 
necessary to restore peace and protect the interests of the United 
States. 
152 · 
Yearbook _2!. !!!!, United Nations, 1956, p. 20. 
153Lenczowski, p. 325. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
President Eisenhower, in refering to the Middle East, was quoted as 
saying: "As far as sheer value of territory is concerned, there is no 
more strategically important area in the World."1 The significance of 
this area was magnified by the East-West dispute. If the Cold War had 
not existed the region would have been important to the economic inter-
ests of the United States, but its relationship to the total national 
interests probably would not have been considered a critical one. It 
was within the strategy of the East-West conflict that the Middle East 
became vital. 
Western Europe, a bulwark of strength committed against the spread 
of Communism, was dependent upon the oil of the Middle East to sustain 
its industrial base. If the Kremlin were to control the vital area, the 
United States' objective of containing Communism would be jeopardized. 
Europe would be subject to oil blackmail; the NATO and Baghdad Pact na-
tions would be outflanked; the continent of Africa and the sub-continent 
of India would be exposed to the direct pressure of Communist forces. 
The Middle East was of decisive importance in the East-West con-
flict. It was incumbent upon the United States, as leader of the West, 
to formulate and enact policies which would serve the dual purpose of 
1Byroade, p. 3. 
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denying to the Soviet Union a position of dominance in the Middle East. 
and insuring that the oil of the area was freely available to the West. 
The study has sought to show that the moralistic expression of 
foreign policy goals by John Foster Dulles in support of regional peace 
and stability in the Middle tast. were actually bas€d upon a realistic 
assessment of American national interest - the protection of a source of 
oil vital to Europe. the protection of American oil interests, and the 
prevention of _~viet ascendancy in ·the Middle East. Armed conflict might 
have paralyzed the area as an oil.producing cent~,i'sand as a world communi-,:: ', . . . -.; ~ . 
.. 
cation center •. War could have been doubly defeating because it might 
'· t. 
have led to Soviet intervention in the area9 The USSR was appa~ently 
·committed to suppo~t Nasser. To abandon him would have resulted in~ 
I•' • ' . ,• ~:· 
~· . i· 
loss of prestige .in the areas·of the world the Kremlin was trying to 
influence. 
,, 
. ' .~. .. ~· . . . 
Nasser was guiding a tidal wave of emotional nationalism. This 
force 9 coupled with the support he _received from the Soviet Bloc, gave 
' I . - . 
him the requisf te power to settle the Canal dispute vir;t;\1,ally on his own 
terms. Dulles clearly. pe:r.ceived that the Egyptian .President .. held the.· 
.. ·., ., 
key position of:·,st~ength .. in the Middle East. He controlled the Suez . 
·. -( 
waterway and he was the Arab bloc leader, at least·· in matters of defense, 
. -
These two factors gave him control of Middle East oil to the extent that 
he could cripple the industries of Western Europe by depriving them of 
)'!i ' ' 
their source of energy. ·confronted with thi~ reality, Dulles had little 
choice except to concede_that justice, as he saw it, would have to be 
subordinated to the mo?'e vital goals of maintaining peace and containing 
c .. . 
Communism. An international board of Canal directors was not established, 
nor was Nasser forced to.extend the ?'ight of t?'ansit through the waterways 
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he controlled to Israel. 
It is evident that the policies of John Foster Dulles, relative to 
the Suez Crisis of 1956, did protect the vital national interests of the 
United States, at least for the immediate future. With the exception of 
Israel, the Suez Canal remained open to Western shipping. The oil of 
the Middle East continued to be available to the West. The Middle East 
did not come under the control of the Soviet Union. 
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